Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 10, Number 3 (December 1972)

Article 1

The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the
Environmental Battle-Well-Tempered Swords or
Broken Reeds
John P. S. McLaren

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article

Citation Information
McLaren, John P. S.. "The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle-Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds."
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 10.3 (1972) : 505-561.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol10/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL
LAW JOURNAL
Vol. 10

No. 3

December 1972

THE COMMON LAW NUISANCE ACTIONS
AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL BATTLE
WELL-TEMPERED SWORDS OR
BROKEN REEDS?
By JoHN P. S. McLAREN*
The opportunity for anyone to obtain at least a hearing and honest consideration
of matters that he feels important must not be under-estimated. The availability
of a judicial forum means that access to government is a reality for the ordinary

citizen - that he can be heard and, that in a setting of equality, he can require
bureaucrats and even the biggest industries to respond to his questions and to
justify themselves before a disinterested auditor who has the responsibility and
the professional tradition of having to decide controversies upon the merits. The
citizen asserts rights which are entitled to enforcement; he is not a mere supplicant.1

The Law and the Environmental Crisis:Attitudes and Realities
It is only in recent years that significant attention has been directed by
legal scholars, in dealing with the legal ramifications of the environmental crisis,
toward assessing the viability of existing common law actions as instruments of
pollution control. The breadth of the pollution problem in North America and
the apparent urgency of remedial and combative measures on a broad scale
have tended to foster the notion that the only effective and universal expedients
lie in the realm of legislative initiative and administrative intervention. By comparison the common law, with its substantive limits apparently tied to the resolution of narrow conflicts between individuals, and the capricious incidence of
litigation has seemed to the environmentally sensitive lawyer to be essentially
impotent as the source of a viable response.
* Dean

of the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
1 J. Sax, Defending the Environment-A Strategy for Citizen Action (New York:

Alfred Knopf, 1970) at 112.
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Unfortunately, legal action on the environmental front has not squared
with the aspirations of environmentalists, and while it may be foolhardy to
suggest that there has been a reversal of priorities in the minds of environmental
lawyers, it is the case that existing legal actions increasingly are being explored
and vaunted as a complementary, or at least a stop-gap, means of attacking
pollution, and of giving legal substance to environmental values. Environmentalists have found to their frustration that political realities in both Canada and
the United States have belied the expeditious development of comprehensive
and integrated solutions to pollution problems. 2 At the same time the public,
particularly in urban areas, has been progressively sensitized by environmentalists and the news media to the serious nature of the blight of pollution.
Accordingly, citizens, both individually and collectively, are more and more
solicitous of exploiting existing avenues for remedial action.3 In this uneasy
social milieu concerned lawyers cannot afford to sit back and idly hope that by
some legislative miracle the overall problem and the dysphoria which it engenders will be abated overnight. Their ability to utilize the existing law to produce
constructive answers has become crucial. 4 The advantages of creativity in working traditional rules are enhanced with the realization that it is not safe to assume
that those who are charged with protecting the public interest under legislative
schemes will always play that role satisfactorily. Indeed there is increasing
2 For an instructive comparative account of the inadequacy of and lack of integration
in contemporary pollution legislation, see J. Juergensmeyer, A Comparative View of the
Legal Aspects of Pollution Control (1971), 5 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 741, at 741-6. For the
Canadian situation, see A. Lucas, Legal Techniques for Pollution Control: The Role of
the Public (1971), 6 U.B.C.L. Rev. 167, and P. Good, Anti Pollution Legislation and its
Enforcement: An EmpiricalStudy (1971), 6 U.B.C.L. Rev. 271. The complex of legislation
relating to pollution in Canada is collected in 1 & 2 Canadian Industries Limited, A Digest
of EnvironmentalPollution in Canada (Montreal: Canadian Council of Resource Ministers
1970) and Chinook Chemicals Ltd., Eco/Log CanadianPollution Legislation (Toronto:
1971).
3 Perhaps the most interesting example of this trend is the action being currently
pursued in the Federal District Court in Detroit by sixteen residents of Sandwich South
Township in Ontario. The defendants are three large producers of air pollution in the
Detroit-Windsor area, Great Lakes Steel, Allied Chemical Corp., and Detroit Edison
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel No. 35019 U.S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Mich. (1970), 1 Env. Law

Reporter 65150.

4
This thesis underlies a number of recent articles on the viability of the common
law actions. See Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to do While Waiting for
Wasington (1970), 5 Harv. Civ. Rights - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 32; J. Juergensmeyer, Control
of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, [1967] Duke L. L 1126;
J. Jurgensmeyer, Common Law Remedies and the Protection of the Environment (1971),
6 U.B.C.L. Rev. 216; L. Miller, Air Pollution Control: An Introduction to ProcessLiability
and Other PrivateActions (1970), 5 New England L. Rev. 163; L. Miller and D. Borchers,
Private Law Suits and Air Pollution Control (1970), 56 A.B.AJ. 465; E. Roberts, The
Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environment Equals Man Times Courts
Redoubling Their Efforts (1970), 55 Cornell L. Rev. 674; F. Seamans, Tort Liability for
Pollution of Air and Water (1970), 3 Natural Resources Law 146; Comment, Environmental Lawsuit: TraditionalDoctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution (1970),
16 Wayne L. Rev. 1085; Comment, Role of PrivateNuisance Law in the Control of Air
Pollution (1968), 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 107; Note, Right of a Downstream Riparian Owner to
Enjoin Upstream Pollution (1963), 27 Albany L. Rev. 64; Note, Private Remedies for
Water Pollution (1970), 70 Colum. L. Rev. 734; Note, Air Pollution As A Private
Nuisance (1967), 24 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 314; Note, Water Quality Standards in Private

NuisanceActions (1969), 79 Yale L.I. 102.
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scepticism amongst environmental lawyers over the advisability of consigning
our environmental fate entirely to government or to administrative agencies. As
one Canadian authority has commented:
... [R]egulatory agencies generally have displayed a number of disturbing tendencies.... [T]hey may become enmeshed in the bureaucratic web created by the
particular system of administration. They may tend to acquiesce in the elevation
of permits, or effluent fee receipts to the status of vested property rights. They
may, as did several of the major United States regulatory agencies tend, as a
result of prolonged contact through the regulatory process, to adopt the values and
biases of the industries to be regulated. An accord may then be reached and
maintained through agency officials moving to the industry side. They may fail to
strongly enforce their legislation, perhaps on the basis of policy directives from
their Minister; but more likely, simply through inertia and fear of generating
political heat.5

In the light of this sober reflection it is natural that greater emphasis should be
placed on the merits of encouraging the initiative of the citizenry, and of appealing to the courts as rather more dispassionate forums for the discussion and
6
resolution of environmental issues.
The main purpose of this article is to examine the potential of the common
law nuisance actions and the legal and equitable remedies which attend them,
in effecting the desirable social objective of pollution abatement and control.
This emphasis on nuisance reflects the fact that traditionally it was the area of
tort law which was utilized by the courts in responding to what would now be
characterized as anti-pollution suits. It thus has a developed conceptual infrastructure which may be responsive to the promotion of environmental values.
The discussion of the environmental potential of nuisance includes some reflections upon the action's relationship to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,7 and
whether that relationship presents any significant substantive hurdles in the
environmental lawsuit. In addition some attention is directed towards the via-

bility of an analogous cause of action, the impairment of riparian rights, which
shares the field with nuisance in the realm of water pollution.
The Law of Nuisance and the EnvironmentalSuit: A Policy Orientation
It is no exaggeration to assert that the Canadian courts have not been overexercised in the field of pollution abatement suits. Most actions brought under
the nuisance rubric have been motivated by the simple desire of individual plaintiffs to improve their personal living conditions, by persuading a court to force
the perpetrator of the nuisance to abate it, or to pay damages for the inconveni5 A. Lucas, Legal Techniques for Pollution Control: The Role of the Public (1971),
6 U.B.C.L. Rev. 271.
6 The debate in the United States on the place of the Courts in protecting environmental values is already very broad-based, covering not only the potentials of existing
common law actions and the remedies provided by administrative law, but also constitutional initiatives by the judiciary and the development of new causes of action - the most
vaunted being the 'public trust' doctrine. For comprehensive study of the potentials for
citizen action in the courts, see N. Landau & P. Rheingold, The Environmental Law
Handbook (New York: Ballantine, 1971).
7 (1968), L.R. 3 H.L. 330, af'g L. R. 1 Ex. 265.
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ence caused. 8 As the courts have tended to limit their response to the character
of the complaint made, the more general ramifications of the defendant's conduct, and the broader implications of the remedies for others who may face the
same problem as the plaintiff rarely have been considered. The relative lack of
environmental case law suggests that it is at least questionable whether the
courts will be receptive to the bald argument that the common law actions are
obvious vehicles for resolving environmental conflict. It seems to the writer,
therefor, that a necessary prelude to a discussion of the potential of the specific
actions is an articulation of the policy factors which should enable a judge to use
the common law more creatively.
The first point is that the resolution of conflicts between individuals under
the common law in no way precludes a court from looking at the problem before
it in the light of wider community interests. No one would seriously suggest, for
example, that the development of the law of products liability out of Donoghuev.
Stevenson 9 represents the chance congruence of a series of cases in which the
judges wore social blinkers. The underlying motivation has been the desire to
extend legal protection to consumers, and more particularly to open up the possibility of suing the one party who has significant control over the form and substance of manufactured goods. 10 Using this experience as a guide there is nothing
to prevent the judges recognizing the need for environmental protection in their
decision making. Indeed, when one considers the facility which some judges have
shown in traditional nuisance litigation in relating plaintiffs' claims for injunctive
relief against industrial defendants to the immediate economic welfare of the
local community, any attempt to close their minds to environmental concerns
would be to adopt an unwarranted double standard." It is not suggested that
judges should develop a rigid bias in favour of environmental values, but rather
that they should consider them seriously as an important element in the decisionmaking process, and resist the temptation to accept the facile argument,
often
12
used by defendants, that pollution abatement equals economic ruin.
8Interesting exceptions are provided by the cases of McKie v. K.V.P. Co., [1948]
O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201, aff'd. [1949] 1 D.L.R. 39 (C.A.), aff'd.
[1949] S.C.R. 698 and Gauthierv. Naneff, [1971] 1 O.R. 97 (H.C.), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513.
Both actions were launched by a group of riparian owners seeking injunctions against

actual or potential water pollution by the operations of the defendants. The environmental
perspective seems to have been stressed in both, and both judges responded with judgments
which considered the broader environmental ramifications of the defendants' activities.
See text infra.

9[1932] A.C. 562 (H.L. Scot.).
10 Significantly it is Lord Atkin's "neighbour principle", a perfect vehicle for clandestinely importing policy considerations into decision-making, which has been seized upon
in case after case to extend the fairly narrow ratio of the major case.
11 Particularly representative of this judicial attitude is the judgment of Middleton,
J. in the series of cases dealing with the complaints by farmers in the Sudbury region of

damage and inconvenience caused by the nickel smelters in that area-see under the
heading Black v. CanadianCopper Co., [1917] O.W.N. 243 I.C.). See also Bottom v.
Ontario Leaf Tobacco Co., [1935] O.R. 205 (C.A.), [1935] 2 D.L.R. 699.

12This type of argument also provided a basis for the courts' opinions in the cases
in supra, note 11. See also Huston v. Lloyds Refineries Ltd., [1937] O.W.N. 53 (H.C.)

where the assumption of economic ruin led the court to substitute a limited for an absolute
injunction to restrain air pollution.
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One factor which clearly has deflected the attention of both courts and litigants in the past from the environmental ramifications of torts litigation has been
the lack of scientific data in relation to both the environmental consequences of
unrestrained pollution, and effective methods of abatement. The result has all too
often been that the technical ramifications of nuisance litigation have been dictated by the defendant who has been able without fear of contradiction to argue
either that the consequences of his operation are not injurious or that everything
possible has been done to control pollution. 13 This knowledge vacuum is now
being effectively filled, and there is no reason, apart perhaps from the expense to
plaintiffs, why expert evidence should not expose fully the character and degree
of the pollution problem and suggest constructive and feasible ways of dealing
with it. Moreover, the expense factor concerned can be expected to be increasingly offset by greater availability of the findings of both governmental and
independent research, and the emergence of environmental protection groups,
which may bring together a galaxy of environmental talents possessed by people
whose dedication to environmental sanity outweighs their desire to make
14
money.
At first glance tort law and complex questions of science and technology
would appear to be strange bedfellows. The cautious judge may perhaps be
excused for entertaining some trepidation about entering into the assessment of
the type of data and evidence which is likely to mark the anti-pollution common
law suit, especially when he reflects that the decision he reaches has a quasilegislative effect. One can imagine the concern of a judge, used to dealing with
relatively straightforward tort issues, suddenly faced with the question of whether
he should grant an injunction which he may be told will improve the physical, but
retard the economic environment of a community. The existence of judicial discomfort should not, however, be allowed to restrain the development of the law,
if considerations of sound social policy demand it and the practical obstacles can
be surmounted.
Concern over the complexity of evidence advanced should not dissuade the
courts from action. The judges in other fields of tort law, in particular in medical
malpractice suits, have been able to master the often complex and detailed evidence relating to a variety of procedures, and there is no reason why they should
be thwarted in an attempt to comprehend the type of scientific evidence relevant
to pollution suits. Rather more substantial is the objection that the judge in deciding whether an industrial operation should change its processes or go out of
business is in some way usurping the legislative or administrative function. The
obvious reply to this is that the functions of tort law have never been constant
and immutable, but have altered to reflect the demands of new social problems
and shifts in social values. Indeed the aims of tort law have changed perceptibly
in the course of this century. An increasing stress on social welfare objectives has
13 Even where the plaintiff could establish the existence of a nuisance, he would not
have been able in many cases to point with any precision to the complete range of its
adverse effects.
14 It is interesting to note in this regard that the Michie case, supra, note 3, represents

an initiative of Windsor and District Pollution Probe. The writer wishes to express his
thanks to Donnelly Hadden, the attorney for the plaintiffs in that action for providing

details of the suit, and general information on the state of environmental litigation in
the United States.
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resulted in a trend away from concern for finding and emphasizing fault, towards
stressing the desirability of compensation for the victim, and towards developing
cost distribution expedients to guarantee the compensatory objective. 15 It has
recently been argued forcefully by some legal commentators that we should be
exploring new functional directions for tort law. Of particular interest in the
present context is the thesis that courts should emphasize more strongly the
admonitory function of tort law. In essence the idea is to utilize tort actions and
remedies to compel defendants, in particular industrial defendants, to reflect
seriously upon the injurious consequences of their operations and, rather than
treating these consequences as external costs to be borne by the rest of society, to
seek ways of internalizing them by sensible assessment of available preventive
or remedial technology, and the incorporation of the most efficient devices into
their processes. 16 Such a shift in theory could, of course, have very positive
effects in the area of pollution control in forcing industry to wake up to environmental reality, and compelling it to translate its verbal concern for a more
tolerable environment into worthwhile deeds.
Superficially, the above may seem a thoroughly revolutionary suggestion.
However, there already exists in certain tort actions and remedies the seminal
elements of this more general doctrine of enterprise liability, or liability for distinctive risk. Underlying the historical development of nuisance in particular is
the thought that those responsible for unnecessarily troublesome operations
should be saddled with the burden of underwriting the cost of the injuries
caused,' 7 and in extreme cases faced with the choice of modifying their processes
or going out of business. Moreover, the availability of injunctive relief has always
reflected the thought that in some cases permanent redemption must be compelled by the law, and its application the belief that there may be more than one
road to redemption.' 8 It would thus be difficult for a judge to argue convincingly
that directly compelling changes in conduct is entirely alien to the common law
of torts. The only significant difference is that, with the acceptance of this new
thesis, decision making will be directed more openly towards working social
change than has been the case in the past. As the judge operates in a milieu
which is by tradition free from political pressure and lobbying, and is given to
dispassionate weighing of the merits, there is much to be said for the extension of
the judicial role in the present context. Indeed, if it is the genius of the common
law to extend existing principle to accommodate new social reality, the challenge
here is irresistible.
The Nuisance Action and PollutionAbatement
The conceptual jungle which constitutes the common law of nuisance has
15 See C. Wright, The Adequacy of the Law of Torts, [1961] Cam. L.J. 44 for an
excellent analysis of this trend.
16 The most recent and relevant articulation of this thesis is in M. Katz, The Function
of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment (1969), 38 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 587. See also
R. Keeton, Venturing to do Justice (1969) 161; W. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem
in Two Hours (1968), 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1 at 56; G. Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents:
An Approach to Non Fault Allocation of Costs (1965), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 713-4;
Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions (1969), 21 Stan. L. Rev. 383 at
415,419.
17 Katz, supra note 16 at 606.
18 Id., at 608-13.
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been exposed elsewhere. 19 The confusion which has always attended the discussion and application of this branch of the law may be a mixed blessing for the
environmental litigant. Lack of conceptual precision and of crystallized doctrine
at certain points may be of advantage to him in suggesting new trends in judicial
thought. At the same time, illogicality in classification and definition where the
shape and substance of liability have concretized may preclude any significant
forensic manoeuvre.
A.

An InitialDilemma-Which Nuisance?

1.

Public Nuisance

In terms of litigation strategy the first problem is to determine whether the
factual situation falls within the boundaries of public or private nuisance. Given
the environmental litigant's concern for championing what he conceives to be the
public interest, public nuisance which purports to protect the individual in the
exercise of his public rights and which has its genesis in criminal actions to counteract publicly offensive pursuits, such as causing noxious odours, dust, soot and
noise, and fouling public thoroughfares and waterways, would seem to be an
obvious choice. Superficially, an action which appears to stress the plaintiff's
concern for the public interest has obvious attractions for the litigant emphasizing the environmental perspective. Reality, however, is less than kind to the
plaintiff in this regard. The courts in recognizing a private action for public
nuisance have sought to draw a clear dividing line between its criminal and civil
aspects. In brief the civil litigant can only protect his own adversely affected
interest. In the absence of facultative legislation he has no inherent standing to
sue in the public interest, as a private attorney-general. 20 Well established
Canadian authority holds that if the vindication of the public interest is required
then the only party who has standing to initiate a prosecution or a civil suit is
the governmental representative of that interest, usually the provincial, but on
occasion the federal, Attorney-General. 2 1 Even a municipality, which one might
have thought would have a claim to standing as the custodian of the local community interest, has been found impotent in this respect.2 As action by the
19 See F. Newark, The Boundariesof Nuisance (1949), 65 L.Q.R. 480; W. Friedmann,
The Incidence of Liability in Nuisance (1943), 59 L.Q.R. 63; J. McLaren, "Nuisance in
Canada!' in A. Linden ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968)
at 320.
20
Oak Bay v. Gardner(1914), 19 B.C.R. 391 (C.A.), 6 W.W.R. 1023, 17 D.L.R. 805;
Turtle v. Toronto (1924), 56 O.L.R. (C.A.); St. Lawrence Rendering Co. v. Cornwall,
[1951] O.R. 669 (H.C.), [1951] 4 D.L.R. 790; Grant v. St. Lawrence Seaway Authority,
[1960] O.W.N. 249 (C.A.).
21
See the authorities cited in supra, note 20. For a recent example of initiative by a
provincial Attorney-General, see A-G for B.C. v. Haney Speedways Ltd. (1963), 39 D.L.R.
(2d) 48 (B.C.S.C.) (noise from a speedway track). For a case in which the Attorney-General
for Canada brought action, see A-G for Canadav. Bristow (1943), 17 M.P.R. 39 (N.S.C.A.),
[1943] 3 D.L.R. 50 (obstruction to navigation on public waterway).
22
Oak Bay v. Gardner(1914), 19 B.C.R. 391 (C.A.), 6 W.W.R. 1023, 17 D.L.R. 805;
St. Lawrence Renderingv. Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 (H.C.), [1951] 4 D.L.R. 790.
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Attorney-General is discretionary, there is no guarantee that he will respond
affirmatively to complaints and pleas for action by concerned citizens.p
The practical effect of this limitation on actionability can best be highlighted by testing the viability of public nuisance in the area of conservation of
wilderness and resort areas. The adverse effects of pollution upon our recreational pursuits have become only too obvious in the last decade. Prior to that
point in time most urbanites who experienced pollution in their everyday lives
could find perhaps some solace in the possibility of vacationing in a clean rural
environment. Now in many instances the escape is from one form of pollution to
another. With the realization that pollution is no respecter of urban-rural boundaries, and greater citizen sensitivity to the need to protect the natural environment, the question is raised of what the individual can do through the courts to
protect the wilderness, the resort area, the provincial or national park from the
blight of pollution. The answer, insofar as he seeks to found his claim in tort
law solely on the basis of his concern as a member of the public, is nothing.
Unless he can tie his action to the infringement of a private right which he
possesses, his only resort to remedy the polluted environment is to fall back
upon the traditional and often ineffective device of bringing pressure to bear in
the political arena, more especially by seeking to goad the Attorney-General
into action. The agonizing truth is that the only common law tort action which
has its origins in solicitude for the public welfare is of negligible utility in satisfying a growing public concern for the conservation of the country's natural
heritage.24
In addition to its limited viability as an action for the citizen to protect the
public interest, public nuisance has distinct shortcomings as a vehicle for the
protection of individual rights. Consonant with their desire to divorce the public
and private elements in this action, the courts have sought to limit its application
to situations in which the plaintiff can claim damage which is "special", that is
different from that which is or could be expected to be suffered by other members of the public. Interpretations of both the terms "the public" and "special
damage" rendered by some Canadian courts suggest that counsel for the evironmental interest may have to tread with considerable caution in seeking to launch
an environmental suit in public nuisance. In the first place there is some doubt
as to whether 'the public' embraces all those who in a variety of ways do or
could make use of the public facility. It has recently been suggested that a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs who make a special use of a public facility in conjunction
with others in the neighbourhood are barred from suit, on the ground that their
damage in relation to other members of the class is not unique. This was the
considered opinion of Furlong C. J. of the Newfoundland Supreme Court in
23 If a complainant, whether a municipality or private citizen, is successful in inducing
the Attorney-General to act he may be included in the suit as a relator- see A-G for B.C.
v. Haney Speedways Ltd. (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 48 (B.C.S.C.), where the seven local
residents who complained of the noise were joined as relators. Quaere whether as land
occupiers they needed to rely on public nuisance.
2
4 This explains the developing enthusiasm in the United States for the 'public trust'
doctrine which recognizes the utility of a private action to protect the public interest. See
Sax, supra, note 1 at 158-74; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention (1970), 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471.
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Hickey v. ElectricReduction Co. of Canada,25 in which he dismissed the action
of a group of commercial fishermen who claimed to have suffered loss in revenue
attributed to the pollution of Placentia Bay by the defendant's plant.26 If this
reasoning is followed, it means that in certain geographical locations, where a
significant proportion of the populace engages in a special productive use of
public water resources, that special use will be the sole frame of reference as to
whether the damage is special or not. For practical purposes the public equals
the special class. Thus counsel who is denied the freedom to sue in the general
public interest may now face the further obstacle that he cannot represent that
segment of the populace which is most adversely affected by it, if that segment is
too large.27
Secondly, although it is well accepted that personal injury and property
damage fall within the designation "special damage", 28 there is some conflict as
to whether it comprehends purely financial loss. The Hickey case, which is
supported by two earlier decisions relating to commercial benefits derived from
fisheries, 29 denies that it does. 30 The rationale for this rather remarkable finding
is to be found in a statement of Baxter, J. in Filion v. New Brunswick InternationalPaperCo.,31 a case involving an alleged interference with the fishing of
a commercial smelt fisherman by waste from the defendant's pulp mill. The
judge asserted that since the plaintiff could have no greater rights than other
members of the public in fishing, any damage which flowed from pollution of
the fishery was by definition merely different in degree from that incurred by
25 (1972), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 368.
26 Id., at 371-72.

27 W. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance (1966), 52 Va. L. Rev. 997 at 1010,
1015 indicates that authority in the United States favours the denial of a claim in public
nuisance where the whole or a large proportion of the local community are adversely
affected and suffer the same type of damage. See in particular Smedberg v. Moxie Dam Co.
(1952), 148 Me. 302, 92 A.2d 606 (destruction of fish in a lake affected business of all the
fishing camps in an area). The practical effect of the Hickey decision is alarming in that
it can be argued that the plaintiffs had no other means of recourse. If they chose negligence
they would have had the problem that liability does not usually extend to purely financial
loss. In that regard it is interesting to note that Furlong C.J. referred to negligence cases
in support of a more general proposition which he made, that in public nuisance 'mere'
economic loss is not sufficient to ground an action. He specifically approved of Lord
Denning M.R.'s opinion in SCM (U.K.) Ltd. v. W. J. Whittal & Sons Ltd., [1970] 3 All
E.R. 245 (C.A.) that economic loss without direct damage is not usually recoverable at law.
If Rylands v. Fletcherwas appealed to, the same objection could be raised and might well
succeed, as the courts have never considered that cause of action in a case where there was
lacking personal injury or damage to property in which the plaintiff had a legal interest.
Even if a court was sympathetic on that issue, the plaintiffs would face the added obstacle
of non-natural use.
28
See e.g. Mintz v. Hamilton RadialElectric Ry. (1923), 53 O.L.R. 171 (C.A.), [1923]
1 D.L.R. 268 (knee injury); Stephens v. MacMillan, [1954] O.R. 133 (H.C.), [1954] 2
D.L.R. 135 (damage to aircraft).
29
Filion v. N.B. International Paper Co. (1934), 8 M.P.R. 89 (N.B.S.C.), [1934]
3 D.L.R. 22; McKie v. K.V.P. Co., [1948] O.R. 398 (I-C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201 (loss of
revenue by tourist camp operators due to pollution of fishery). See also McRae v. British
Norwegian Whaling Co. (1927-31), 12 Nfid. L.R. 274 (S.C.), upon which Furlong CJ.
relied heavily in the Hickey case.
3O Supra, note 25 at 370-71.
31(1934), 8 M.P.R. 89 (N.B.S.C.), [1934] 3 D.L.R. 22.
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others.32 The decision fails to recognize that uses of public resources vary considerably in incidence and importance, and that this fact is reflected in a wide
spectrum of adverse consequences in the event of interference, ranging from
minor annoyance to financial ruin. Moreover, the court by divorcing the issue of
rights from that of uses suggested another and more far reaching limitation of
the anti-pollution suit, that is that whatever the incidence of the special use
recovery for financial loss will be barred. The type of victim of pollution who
incurs financial loss is the most likely to suffer from its long-term effects because
of his permanent interest in the resources and his investment in utilizing it. He
therefore has the greatest incentive to remedy it. Accordingly his exclusion from
suit would mean the effective submersion of the environmental interest in public
nuisance suits. Fortunately there is a countervailing trend in Canadian jurisprudence. There exists a triad of Ontario appellate decisions which have come
to the opposite conclusion in an analogous context.3 3 Each of these decisions
make it clear that financial loss incurred by commercial concerns engaged in
shipping enterprises on navigable waterways 34 by obstructions to navigation,
amounts to 'special damage'. There is no difference in principle between financial loss flowing from interference with the commercial uses of the right to
navigate and the right to fish in public waters. The nub of the complaint in both
cases is the adverse effect upon the use, and upon it alone. Given this equation
there is no reason why environmental counsel should not use these latter
decisions effectively to counter the arguments of the fishery cases.
The controversy in Canadian jurisprudence over whether financial loss is
'special damage' does not leave one too sanguine about the possibility of the
courts accepting the more general argument that a difference in the degree of
damage is sufficient to found a private action in public nuisance. The only
decisions which lend some support to the argument are three early Ontario
cases, one involving obstruction of a highway 35 and the others navigable waterways, 36 which imply that an aggravated degree of inconvenience (in these
instances to plaintiffs who depended upon the thoroughfares as channels of
communication with the outside world) is enough. The utility of these decisions
will depend on the willingness of a court to divorce them from their special facts,
for it may be argued that the interference in each case came close to being an
invasion of the property right of unobstructed ingress and egress, and thus tantamount to a private nuisance. 37 At best their authority as support for a difference
in degree as the appropriate criterion may be described as tenuous. In conse32 Id., at 96, 26.
33 Crandell v. Mooney

(1878), 23 U.C.C.P. 212 (C.A.); Rainy River Navigation Co.
v. Ontario &Minnesota Power Co. (1914), 26 O.W.R. 752 (C.A.), 17 D.L.R. 850; Rainy
River Navigation Co. v. Watrous Island Boom Co. (1914), 26 O.W.R. 456 (C.A.), 6 O.W.N.
537.
3
4 In each case the plaintiffs earned money from carrying freight and passengers.
35 O'Neil v. Harper (1913), 28 O.L.R. 635 (C.A.), 13 D.L.R. 649.
36 Drake v. Sault Ste. Marie Pulp & Paper Co. (1898), 25 O.A.R. 251; Ireson v. Holt
Timber Co. (1914), 30 O.L.R. 209 (C.A.), 18 D.L.R. 604.
37 There is clearly not much difference in result between the situation in which the
gateway or entrance to the plaintiff's land is blocked, and the situation where a vital access
route to his land is obstructed, albeit at some distance from his property. The property
may be effectively isolated from the outside world.
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quence, it is not possible to be confident about using public nuisance inventively
protect individuals who are subjected to an aggravated degree of inconvenience
from pollution in public places. Thus the worker in a city whose employment
is the street or park and who is the victim of constant exposure to noise and
air pollution may find that unless his health has as a result of his working
conditions perceptibly deteriorated or he can point to property damage he has
38
no standing. His concern to improve his working milieu may be of no avail.
The restrictive nature of the rules surrounding the private action in public
nuisance, and the unsatisfactory state of Canadian case authority, suggest that
the action has limited potential as a means of vindicating the interests of environmentalists. The unfortunate irony of the development of this branch of the law
of nuisance is that the chances of the concerned citizen achieving positive results
decrease in inverse proportion to the gravity of the offending pollution problem
and its adverse consequences. The environmental lawyer is effectively hamstrung in seeking to inject the anti-pollution perspective into the action, because
he has to avoid at all costs giving the impression that the defendant's activity is
causing a widespread common problem. If he does then his client's damage may
become indistinguishable from that suffered by the rest of the community, and
he will fail to sustain the unique nature of his claim.
The policy reasons underlying these judicial roadblocks are the fear of a
multiplicity of claims and the launching of trivial suits. 39 One wonders whether
this 'floodgates' type of thinking has any more validity here than in other areas
of tort law in which it has been utilized to prevent or delay progressive development.40 It has never been adequately proven that breakthroughs into new areas
of liability trigger off large numbers of claims, let alone claims which are trivial.
It may of course be argued that with the advent of widespread concern over
pollution, that a stimulus to a multiplicity of actions would be provided by a
more liberal approach to standing. However, it is the writer's opinion that the
more likely result is the coalescence of effort by concerned citizens. There would
obviously be suits, but suits involving large numbers of complainants, genuinely
launched in the public interest. Furthermore, if there are trivial claims, it is
surely not beyond the capacity of the courts to expose and discourage them. 41
The overriding factor in seeking more flexibility here is to circumvent the concern for economic expediency, which may restrain the official protectors of the
public interest. However, in the absence of legislation it may be doubted whether
38 For some of the problem associated with employment in polluted urban environments see K. Lasson, The Workers; Portraitsof Nine American Jobholders (New YorkGrossman, 1971).
39
Prosser, supra, note 27. See also Restatement; Torts 2d (Tentative Draft No. 17:
1971) at 14.
40 For example the fear expressed by Lord Abinger in Winterbottom v. Wright (1842),
10 M & W 109 (Exch), 152 E.R. 402 that to extend liability for negligence beyond the
contractual relationship would be that 'the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I see no limit, would ensue' has hardly been justified by the recognition of such
an extension in this century.
41 It is clearly within the powers of a court to substitute damages for injunctive relief,
and to award a nominal sum. Moerover, there is nothing to prevent a judge denying costs
to the plaintiff, though he is technically entitled to a verdict.
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there will be any significant judicial movement in the direction of liberalization
of standing. 42
2.

Private Nuisance

By comparison the action for private nuisance offers a positive medium of
legal redress for environmentalists. This species of nuisance has as its objective
the protection of the individual in the use and enjoyment of his land from the
damage, injury or inconvenience caused by operations carried out upon the
land of others or in public places. Traditionally the action has covered industrial
processes causing smells, smokes, poisons, particulates, waste, and noise which
have harmed or annoyed individuals.
Ostensibly, the vindication of individual property rights would seem to be
a poor basis for emphasizing the broader community concern with pollution.
However, there are features of this species of nuisance which may permit both
creativity and inventiveness in developing an environmental perspective. Its
primary attraction is that it seems to be no obstacle to success that the pollution
is also adversely affecting the legal interests of others. The defendant cannot
argue that his pollution is so widespread and its effects so generally felt amongst
the populace, that it is by definition a public nuisance, and in the absence of
'special damage' not actionable. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Cairns v.
CanadianRefining Co.,43 in which the plaintiff was claiming damages for injury
to his person and property caused by arsenic fumes emanating from the defendant's smelter and descending upon the surrounding community, did indicate
that in such case the claim might be brought in either private or public nuisance.44 The decision, however, clearly implies that if the claimant chooses
public nuisance, the 'special damage' requirement is satisfied by an injury to
his private right in property, so that in either case liability depends upon the
existence of a private nuisance. 45 In private nuisance, once the plaintiff has
established an unwarranted interference with his rights over land he is entitled
to a remedy, however severe the effect of the pollution on others, whether they
are exercising public rights, or enjoying private rights in property. It is an
obvious and important corollary of this rule that each person suffering interference with his interests in property is entitled to seek a remedy. 46 The policy
rationale behind this refusal to entertain the 'public nuisance' argument is
42 It is interesting to note that in those jurisdictions in the United States in which the
notion of standing in public nuisance has been expanded, this has been achieved by
legislation. See Wisc. Stat. Am. § 280.02; Fla. Stats. Am. § 60.05. Such statutes have been
used from time to time to deal with environmental problems. See National Container
Corp. v. State (1939), 138 Fla. 32, 189 So. 4 (suit to enjoin the erection of a pulp mill).
The most significant departure from the traditional rules is the Michigan Environmental
Protection Act 1970 P.A. 127 which allows any person to bring an action for declaratory
and equitable relief from pollution, whether he is adversely affected by it or not. Thus
it would be possible for a citizen of Detroit to initiate a suit against a polluter in Sault Ste.
Marie at the other end of the State and vice-versa.
43 (1914), 26 O.W.R. 490 (C.A.), 6 O.W.N. 562.
44 Id., at 492, 564.
45 The court expressly dissented from the view expressed by Boyd C. at trial, (1914),
25 O.W.R. 384,5 O.W.N. 423 (H.C.).
46 Id., at 495, 564.
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perhaps best explained in a statement of the Supreme Court of California in
Fisher v. Zumwalt,47 an air pollution suit in which the 'converted nuisance'
ploy was tried:
... [S]uch a doctrine [would not be] consistent with sound principle. Carried out
practically, it would deprive persons of all redress for injury to property or health,
or for personal annoyance and discomfort, in all cases where the nuisance was so
general and extensive as to be a legitimate subject of a public prosecution; so that,
in effect a wrongdoer would escape all liability to make indemnity for private
rights by carrying on an offensive trade or occupation in such place and manner
as to cause injury and annoyance to a sufficient number of persons to create a
common nuisance .... 48

In short, he would acquire a vested right to pollute.
The practical effect of this refusal to give any weight to damage to the public
interest as a negative factor is that counsel for an environmental plaintiff can
expose the public interest as a positive factor. While it is true that he has to be
careful to emphasize the unwarranted interference with the rights of his client
he is free to make adequate use of local experience through his witnesses. Evidence of widespread social concern about the effects of the pollution may prove
to be a valuable element in his case, more especially when the defendant is likely
to try and persuade the court of the infallibility of its technical expertise, and
49
claim to be the economic saviour and mentor of the surrounding community.
B.

Who May Sue andHow Many

The scope of private nuisance, tied as it is to proprietary interests, is
limited. It is essential that the plaintiff claim not only a right to the land, but
also effective occupation of it.50 The only leeway allowed by the law is the
extension of the action to cover the members of the land occupier's family, as
long as they are resident thereon.51 The substantive confines of the tort need
not, however, be a significant hindrance to the launching of environmental suits.
The effects of air, water and noise pollution are usually diffuse enough to affect
private property close to the source, and often the degree of interference with
the use and enjoyment of the occupiers will be sufficient to cause some of them
to seek a remedy.
A serious procedural issue is the question of whether the environmental
suit must focus solely on the complaint of a single plaintiff, or can be converted
47 (1900), 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82.
48 Id., at 495, 83. For a more recent expression of opinion in the same vein, see
Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Construction Inc. (1962), 174 Neb. 234, 117 N.W. 2d 332.
49 For an excellent outline of the conduct of an environmental case in nuisance,
including comments on the utility of lay evidence, see D. Hadden, "Presenting the Air
Pollution Case" in R. Needham ed., Legal Control of the Environment-3D (N.Y.:
Practising Law Institute, 1971) at 49, 94-96.
50 A reversioner may sue in nuisance only if the interference or damage is of a continuous or permanent nature: Billingsgate Fish Ltd. v. B.C. Sugar Refining Co. (1933),
46 B.C.R. 543 (S.C.), [1933] 1 W.W.R. 530; Park v. White (1893), 23 O.R. 611 (C.A.);
Landzick v. Robinson (1935), 43 Man. R. 30. On the position of mortgagees see Preston
v. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 (H.C.), 55 D.L.R. 647.
51 See e.g. Bottom v. OntarioLeaf Tobacco, [1935] O.R. 205 (C.A.), [1935] 2 D.L.R.
699, where damages were awarded to cover the inconvenience caused by the defendant's
operations to both the occupier and his wife.
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into a group action. Obviously, the major point in bringing an environmental

suit is to seek a legal solution to a pollution problem which benefits the local
community as a whole. The most effective way of achieving this end is to bring
into court, either in person or through a representative, those complainants who
have suffered significant interference from the pollution source in question.
There is a problem, however, of how receptive Canadian courts will be to the
initiation of a case as a multi-claimant suit.
The most attractive way of bringing a multi-claimant suit would be to
launch a class action in which the actual plaintiff would sue both in his own
right and as the representative of all other parties adversely affected. Unfortunately, what little case law there is on class actions in Canada suggests that the
expedient is not available where a claim in tort is brought, whether it be for
damages or injunctive relief. Thus, in Preston v. Hilton52 the plaintiff, who
sought an injunction on her own behalf, and on that of other property owners
on the same street, against the erection of wagon sheds and stables in the immediate vicinity, was denied the right to continue the suit in a representative
capacity. The primary reason for the decision seems to have been that, in an
action of this nature, although the complainants may have suffered, or niay
have feared damage from a common source, the injury or threatened injury was
peculiar to each person or his property and each action was therefor discrete.
This type of situation, where the interests were merely similar, was distinguishable from that where the interests of the claimants were the same, for example
the case in which creditors had been defrauded, where the only difference in
interest was the share of each claimant in a common fund. To emphasize the
limits of the class action the court quoted with approval a statement of FletcherMoulton L.J. in Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.53
The proper domain of the representative action is where there are like rights
against a common fund, or where a class of people have a community of interest
in some subject matter.54

As the Preston case has been followed by the only other Canadian cases
on point,55 and seems to accord with the spirit of English jurisprudence on the
matter,5 6 it may be questioned whether there is anything counsel can do to
remedy the situation. The one possible line of argument is that the requirement
that the interest be the 'same' found in Preston and in Ontario's Rule 75 and its
equivalents5 7 is satisfied in a nuisance suit where an injunction is sought, and
the complaint of the aggrieved parties relates as much to the quality of the
environment, in which they have a common interest, as it does to their individual
interest in the use and enjoyment of their property. As the grant of a class action
by the judge is discretionary, it may be argued that there is something to be said
52

Prestonv. Hilton (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 (H.C.), 55 D.L.R. 647.
53 [1910 2 KB. 1021 (C.A.).
54 Id., at 1039.
55 Turtle v. Toronto (1924), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.), 27 O.W.R. 242; St. Lawrence
Rendering Co. v. Cornwall, [1951] O.R. 669 (H.C.), [1951] 4 D.L.R. 790.
56 1 Jacob, The Supreme CourtPractice1970, at 187-9.
57 The rules of the other Provinces seem to contain identical or similar provisions.
See e.g. Alta. Rules of Court 1969, r.42 ('common interest') N.B. Rules 1969, 0.16(9)
('same interest'); Sask. Rules 1961 r.45 ('same interest).
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for preserving a degree of flexibility in its use5s and interpreting the power in the
light of new social realities.
Regardless of the difficulties which may be faced in inducing the courts to
recognize the legitimacy of the class action in nuisance suits, it still may be
possible to broaden the area of grievance by seeking to join the actions of the
several plaintiffs. Under Rule 66 in Ontario the joinder of plaintiffs is dependent not upon the existence of the 'same interest', but upon 'common questions
of law or fact', 59 a requirement which would be satisfied if a number of occupiers
were suing in nuisance a defendant who was the alleged source of pollution in
the neighbourhood. What little case law there is on the subject suggests that
joinder is appropriate in nuisance suits. In Prestonv. Hilton, Orde J. indicated
that it might have been possible to include all the aggrieved parties in the action
under Rule 66.60 In a more positive vein Latchford J. in Gagnon v. Dominion
Stamping,61 a noise pollution action brought by one plaintiff as a test case,
opined that the case should more appropriately have been brought as a joint
action under Rule 66.62 While there are practical problems in joining plaintiffs
in some types of actions, for example in a suit brought by the numerous shareholders of company, because of the necessity of obtaining the consent of each
aggrieved party and seeking their approval of a single legal representative, it is
unlikely that these difficulties will arise in the present context. As the environmental suit will usually be a collaborative effort by a group of concerned citizens,
who may well be members of an environmental protection group, there is likely
to be every incentive to select the most expeditious way of bringing their collective grievances before a court and entrusting the matter to one lawyer.
C. Who May Be Sued and How Many
Although it is essential to the plaintiff's claim that he prove some possessory
right in land, the same sort of interest need not exist in the defendant. This is
entirely logical because the essence of the tort is interference with the plaintiff's
use and enjoyment of his property. While the majority of nuisance cases involve
competing uses of land, there are decisions in Canada which leave no doubt that
liability will be imposed where the defendant is not a land occupier, for example
where he has a mere license to use land,63 or is engaged in some activity in a
public place.64.
58A point made by Megarry J. in John v. Rees, [1970] Ch. 345, [1969] 2 W.L.R.
1294, 369, 1306 (representative action on behalf of members of a constituency division
of the Labour Party to prevent leaders of a disaffected group from running the local party
machine).
59 Again this rule has its equivalents in the other Canadian jurisdictions. See e.g.
Alta. Rules 1969, r.36; N.B. Rules 1969, 0.16(1); Sask. Rules 1961, r.39.
6
OSupra,note 52 at 179, 654.
61 (1914), 7 O.W.N. 530 (H.C.).
62Id., at 533.
63 See e.g. Weber v. Berlin (1904), 8 O.L.R. 302 (H.C.); Crowtherv. Coburg (1912),
20 O.W.R. 844 (H.C.), 1 D.L.R. 40; Groat v. Edmonton, [1928] S.C.R. 522, [1928]
3 D.L.R. 725.
64 See e.g. the authorities supporting the use of private nuisance for obstructions on
highways interfering with ingress and egress -Forster v. Medicine Hat (1913), 5 Alta.
L. R. 36 (S.C.), 6 W.W.R. 548; Prentice v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1928] S.C.R. 309, [1928]

3 D.L.R. 564; Toronto TransportationCo. v. Swansea, [1935] S.C.R. 455, [1935] 3 D.L.R.
619; Hagel v. Yellowknife (1957), 6 D.L.R. (2d) 417 (N.W.T.C.A.).
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With defendants there is again the problem of a multiplicity of suits. In
pollution situations in which a plaintiff's interest is subjected to interference
from a number of industrial sources it makes a good deal of sense, both in terms
of proof and seeking an overall solution, to bring a single action against all the
offenders, or at least the chronic polluters. The practical method of achieving
this purpose is to join the actions. Subject to the judge's power to order separate
trials if he considers it unjust to do otherwise, joinder is allowed where the
several causes of action arise out of the same occurrence or series of occurrences, or where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is
entitled to redress. 65 This expedient would seem to be admirably suited to the
environmental suit, because it allows the plaintiff to bring several polluters into
court together, and if he is uncertain of the potential liability of any of them
permits him to avoid the expense and frustration which he might experience if
he chose an inappropriate single defendant.
D. Nuisance Models and the Liability Issue
One significant area of nuisance law in which confusion continues to reign
in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence is that of the basis of liability. In the minds
of many judges nuisance seems to conjure up a rather messy collage of strict
liability and negligence, with no clear pointers to the applicability of either. The
attempts at rationalization by the courts are so abstract as to be useless as reliable precedent. When we are variously informed that liability in nuisance is
strict,66 that proof of negligence is not required in nuisance, 67 that nuisance and
negligence are almost assimilated, 68 that fault is nearly always present in nuisance, 69 that foreseeability is the test for remoteness in nuisance, 70 and that
Rylands v. Fletcheris analogous to, but different from nuisance, 71 counsel might
be forgiven for concluding that he is on his own. In fact the lack of any comprehensive rationalization of the relationship between nuisance, negligence and
Rylands v. Fletcher may provide the environmental lawyer with some latitude
in proceeding with a theory of liability most favourable to his client. What
follows is an attempt to view the question of liability in nuisance along functional
lines, that is, to relate it to what the plaintiff is trying to achieve in launching
his suit, and to expose the potential for creative argument that exists in the
present amorphous state of the law.
65
See Ontario Rules of Court 67. For equivalents in other provinces see Alta. Rules
1969 r.46; N.B. Rules 1969, 0.16 (4) (7); Sask. Rules 1961 r.42.
66
Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156 (H.L.), [1946] 2 All E.R. 471, per
Lord Simonds at 183, 482.
67 B.C. Pea Growers Ltd. v. Portage La Prairie,[1966] S.C.R. 150, 54 W.W.R. 477,
per Martland J. at 157, 483-4.
68
MacMillan Bloedel (Alberni) Ltd. v. B.C. Hydro (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 164

(B.C.S.C.) per Rae J., at 181.
69

Overseas Tankshlip (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller SS. Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617 (P.C.,
Aust.), [1966] 3 W.L.R. 498, per Lord Reid at 639,508.
70 Id., at 640, 509.
71 Jp. PorterCo. v. Bell, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 62 (N.S.C.A.), per McDonald l.A. at 64-65.
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The Relevance of the Defendant's Conduct of his Operation

(a) The ContinuingNuisance
Judges are often fond of remarking that liability in nuisance is strict, that
fault in the traditional sense at least is not a condition of the plaintiff's success.
The major problem with this generalization is that it assumes that it is possible
to translate doctrine from other areas of tort law without relating it to the
peculiarities of the nuisance action. It is this writer's contention that nuisance
has a distinct function in the law, and to some extent has developed its own
special liability concepts. The model pollution suit of the future will revolve
around a distinctive factual framework. A plaintiff or group of plaintiffs will
come to court alleging that the operations of an industrial or municipal defendant are causing an intolerable degree of interference with their use and enjoyment of land and the physical environment of the community at large. While
the complaints may relate in part to interference in the past, and be attended
by a claim for damages, the main thrust of the action will be to argue that the
defendant's pollution is a present and a future menace to the individual and
community interest, and that it should be enjoined or at least modified. In this
context the cardinal question is not the legal characterization of the defendant's
conduct, but rather the degree of interference experienced by the plaintiff and
his neighbours. The issue is whether the conditions in which the plaintiff is
forced to live as a result of the defendant's pollutants are beyond the bounds of
reasonable tolerance. It is true that the answer to this question requires a careful
consideration of the surrounding circumstances, including the nature and conduct of the defendant's process and its utility, but these are colouring factors
rather than the necessary desiderata of liability. Insofar as Canadian judges
have addressed themselves to this problem, the consensus seems to be that the
plaintiff does not have any burden upon him to prove fault in the traditional
sense. 72 The evidentiary onus lies rather in proving that the level of interference
is beyond that which he should reasonably be expected to bear in the circumstances. American commentators and judges have tended to argue to the contrary that the conduct of the defendant is an important factor in these cases, and
that fault must be shown in addition to unreasonable interference. 73 Whether
this divergence in opinion is of any practical import is doubtful. If environmental plaintiffs come to court complaining of subsisting pollution, which they
want abated, there can be no question that the defendant has already been fully
apprised of the problem. Accordingly, given his knowledge, and absent any
serious attempt to respond to it by voluntary abatement procedures, it can be
72 Chandler Electric Co. v. H.H. Fuller & Co. (1892), 21 S.C.R. 337 aff'g 23 N.S.R.

263 (sub. nom. Fullerv. Pearson);Andrews v. Cape Breton Electric Co. (1904), 37 N.S.R.
105 (C.A.); Walker v. McKinnon IndustriesLtd., [1949] O.R. 549 (H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R.;
739; Russell TransportLtd. v. OntarioMalleable Iron, [19521 O.R. 621 (1-.C.), [1952]

4 D.L.R. 719; B.C. Pea Growers Ltd. v. Portage La Prairie,supra, note 67.
73 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed., St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,

1971) 574; P. Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance and Strict Liability (1959), 59 Col. L. Rev. 457;
Restatement; Torts 2d (Tentative Draft No. 17; 1971); Wright v. Masonite Corp. (1965),
368 F.2d 661 (4th Circ.); Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930), 182 Minn. 66, 233 N.W.

597; Schindler v. Standard Oil of Ind. (1921), 207 Mo. App. 190, 232 S.W. 735; Rose v.
Socony Vacuum Corp. (1934), 54 R.1. 411, 173 A. 627; Ettl v. Land & Loan Co. (1939),

122 N.J.L. 401, 5 A.2d. 689.
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argued that he intends the consequences of his acts. If those consequences constitute an undesirable level of pollution, then he intends to pollute, and he has
committed an intentional tort. The basic difference between the Canadian and
what might be classified as the Restatement approach is that the former assumes
this reality, whereas the latter seems to require its articulation. It is most unlikely
that there would be any difference in result.
Just as the plaintiff is freed from proving fault it is not a decisive argument
on the part of the defendant that he is taking reasonable care in the operation
of his process. 74 This would seem to apply whether he is operating a plant which
is not the most effective in environmental terms, in a competent and solicitous
manner, or operating the most effective process in terms of pollution abatement. 75 As long as the result is an intolerable degree of interference with the
plaintiff's rights liability follows. At the least the courts are prepared to force
the polluter to underwrite the cost of the adverse consequences of his process.
(b) The Past Nuisance
A second type of nuisance model comprises actions by complainants for
damages or injuries already suffered. Here the difference from negligence
models is not so readily apparent, and the law is rather less settled on the basis
of liability. The situation can arise in both an action which joins a claim for past
damages with a prayer for an injunction, and in a claim which relates solely to
past damages. Some nuisance cases of this type undoubtedly will be dealt with
along the same lines as the first model. Thus, where the plaintiff's grievance
relates to a sustained exposure to pollution in the past, the defendant in most
cases will have been aware of the problem and the injurious effects alleged.
Here the only real issue is whether the interference with the plaintiff's interests
during that period was excessive. Again, fault in the traditional sense is treated
as incidental. 76 Where problems of liability theory do arise is where there was
no actual awareness by the defendant polluter that he was causing harm-the
type of situation which usually presupposes that the plaintiff was unaware of
any problem, or if he was, that he could not associate it with any operation of
the defendant. In view of the clandestine operation of certain pollutants on
health and both animate and inanimate objects, and the layman's lack of experthat
tise in the area of pollution and its physical consequences, it is quite likely
this type of model will face the environmental lawyer from time to time.77
74

Drysdale v. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20; Appleby v. Erie Tobacco Co. (1910), 22
O.L.R. 533 (H.C.); Walker v. McKinnon, [1949] O.R. 549 (H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R.;
739; Russell TransportLtd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron, [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.), [1952]
4D.L.R. 719; Atwellv. Knights, [1967] O.R.419 (H.C.), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 108.
75 See Bottom v. Ontario Leaf Tobacco, [1935] O.R. 205 (CA.), [1935] 2 D.L.R.
699, where the court while refusing to grant an injunction did award damages to
the plaintiffs, although it had been proved that every conceivable device for preventing the
spread of tobacco fumes had been used.
76 See e.g. Russell TransportLtd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron, [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.),
[1952] 4 D.L.R. 719, in which McRuer C.J. makes no distinction in the principles of
liability to be applied in dealing with the issues of past damages on the one hand and
continuing damage on the other.
77 For a fact situation which amply illustrates this model, see Wright v. Masonite Corp.
(1965), 368 F. 2d 661 (4th Circ.). See text infrap. 523.
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The only jurisdictions in which any attempt has been made to rationalize the
pattern of liability in this area are in the United States. The majority opinion
appears to be that set down in section 822 of the Restatement of Torts, that in.
the absence of proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff is
required to point to some negligence in the defendant's mode of operation, or,
8
if that is impossible, to show that the activity is ultrahazardous2 In essence
the attempt has been made to rationalize nuisance into the tri-fold contemporary pattern of liability. A minority view takes the position that nuisance has
always been and has remained a tort of strict liability. 79 An instructive case
which illustrates these conflicting theories is Wright v. Masonite Corp.80 The
plaintiff owned a grocery store adjacent to the defendant's plant where masonite
board was manufactured, a spray containing formaldehyde being employed in
the finishing process. For a period of time the plaintiff's premises were impregnated with a formaldehyde odour which infected his stocks, rendering them
unsaleable. Initial tests of the local air were negative, and it was only some time
later that it was found that small amounts of formaldehyde were being released
into the air from the defendant's process, and that these, changing by synergetic
process into formaldehyde gas, were carried into the store. The trial court found
that a cause-effect relationship had been proven, but that, since the defendant
had been ignorant of the adverse effects of its operation, their action was not
intentional, and so did not constitute a nuisance under North Carolina law.81
The majority of the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial judge's opinion. Haynsworth
CJ speaking for them,82 rejected the proposition that strict liability under
Rylands v. Fletcherapplied automatically to the escape of noxious gases. In his
mind nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher had to be related to the distinction in
liability between intent, negligence and ultra-hazardous activity. Absent a culpable intention, which he interpreted as an intention to cause harm, negligence
or the operation of an ultra-hazardous activity had to be proved. As neither
intention nor negligence could be proven, and as the domestic jurisprudence
had failed to classify the escape of noxious gases as ultra-hazardous, the defendant could not be fixed with liability. The dissenting judgment of Bryant, J. is
based on the minority view of liability.83 Prefacing his judgment with concern
for the plaintiff being left both injured and remediless, he concluded that all that
78

See authorities cited supra,note 73.

79

See Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, (4th Ed.) at 512-3. Dean Prosser

suggests that most cases which apply strict liability under the guise of nuisance, have done
so to obviate the concern voiced in some jurisdictions over accepting openly the Rylands v.
Fletcher doctrine. Viewed in this light it can be argued that strict liability is limited to
those instances involving an ultrahazardous activity or operation. It is evident however,

that this strict liability nuisance approach has been used in a number of cases involving

unexceptional industrial pollution, such as causing smoke, rust, bad odours and noxious
gases, and it is questionable whether the notion of 'absolute nuisance' is as confined as he
suggests. It is interesting to note also that there is presently some conflict amongst academic
lawyers over the nature of liability in nuisance with Professors F. James and R. Keeton
rejecting the Restatement approach and favouring characterization in terms of strict
liability. See Restatement; Torts 2d (Tentative Draft No. 17: 1971) at 31-32.
8

0Supra,note 77.

81 (1965), 237 F. Supp. 129 (N.C.M.D.).
82 Id., at 663-66.
83 Id.,

at 666.
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was required by North Carolina law in a private nuisance action was an unreasonable invasion caused by an 'intentional use' of land by the defendant. He
rejected the Restatement thesis that intention must be related to the adverse
consequences of the polluter's acts. Intention to do the causative acts, that is to
emit fumes was sufficient, and was satisfied here. He concluded his judgment
with the observation:
North Carolina does not hold with the theory that the creator of a nuisance
is
84
liable only from the time he is caught. The State does not allow him one bite.

While a divergence of opinion clearly exists in the United States, those
positions have been clearly articulated, and there is some indication of a dominant trend in authority. By comparison the state of Canadian jurisprudence
suggests little in the way of conscious rationalization. Nevertheless, it is possible
to detect a definite trend in the authorities which may assist environmental
counsel. The question of the law's response to this type of model in Canada
depends basically upon the nature of the relationship between nuisance and the
rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The early law of nuisance, perhaps reflecting its
roots in property law, seems to have rested upon strict liability.85 Indeed, it does
not appear that there was any challenge to this assumption until late in the last
century. Certainly Blackburn J. and Lord Cranworth in their judgement in
Rylands v. Fletcher entertained no doubts on the matter. 86 Blackburn J.'s
opinion in particular is posited on the belief that liability in the instant case was
a specific example of a general principle of liability without fault, which flowed
through the injury to land cases.8 7 While by that time no one seems to have
bothered to determine the rationale for this approach, the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas possessed the sort of historical respectability which made
further reflection unnecessary. The first doubt to be cast upon the general thesis
lay in the judgment of Lord Cairns in the Rylands case, for he was only prepared
to impose strict liability in the case before him, if the use of the land by the
defendant was non-natural.8 8 Ever since it has been assumed that, in the absence
of that condition, negligence is required.
The crucial issue for the environmental lawyer is whether Rylands v.
Fletcher completely displaces or subsumes nuisance where the plaintiff's claim
relates to the unintentional causation of past damage. If it does not then it may
be possible for counsel representing the environmental interest to argue both
that nuisance is relevant to the issue in some instances and that where it applies
liability is strict. If it does, then it means that in the case of the second model
the natural/non-natural dichotomy becomes a hurdle.
84 Id., at 667.
8

5For early development of nuisance and its association with property concepts, see

W. McRae,The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law (1948), 1 U. of Fla.

L. Rev. 27. On the liability issue, see Mounsen, Plowden, Wrayes and Manwood, Brief
Declarationfor Special Nuisance Concerning Dwelling Houses (1639) 8, 13, 20. See also
Tenant v. Goldwin (1705), 1 Salk. 360 (K.B.), 91 E.R. 314.

86 Both felt the landowner or occupier had traditionally been an insurer of the safety

of adjacent property from activities on or conditions of their own land. (1865), L.R. 1 Ex.
265, 279-86; (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 341
87 (1868), L.R. 1 Ex. 265 at 279-86.

88 (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 at 339.
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It should be said at the outset that there is a distinct lack of authority in
either Canada or England which seeks to equate private nuisance and Rylands
v. Fletcher.Indeed, if anything, there has been an unconscious trend towards
divorcing their substantative content. 89 The present writer has argued elsewhere
that, although we lack any serious attempts to associate these two heads of
liability, it is desirable from the point of view of consistency, and in particular
the need to bring liability for injury to landed interests into line with liability
for personal injury and damage to chattels. 90 In brief, the thesis was propounded
that in the case of unintentional past damage, whatever the interest affected,
the form of liability should depend on whether the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher,
or negligence is appropriate. On further reflection the writer is ready to concede
that the argument that nuisance with its strict liability heritage has its attractions
in an environmental suit brought to remedy past damage. The injection of the
environmental element into nuisance litigation will often mean that the suit is
divorced from the desire to protect narrow interests in land. In a very real sense
the concern is with repairing the injury to the plaintiff's total life style, including
not only his property and its values, but also his physical health and mental
welfare, and that of his family. Given this fact and the very threat which modem
technology poses to a tolerable human existence, the distinction between past
damage and present injury may well break down, in particular where the plaintiff has been subjected to an ongoing invasion of his rights.
The nub of counsel's argument in seeking to distinguish the two actions
would be to suggest that, whereas Rylands v. Fletcherin its genesis and subsequent application has been related to single incident accidents, nuisance is relevant where the plaintiff has been subjected to a sustained interference with his
interests. 91 Under the latter action the question of whether the use of land is
natural or non-natural has never been relevant. However commonplace the use
may be, if it has caused an unreasonable degree of harm to the plaintiff, liability
follows. The effect of the argument, if accepted, would be to wed Rylands v.
89 The trend in Canadian decisions seems to have been to extend Rylands v. Fletcher
beyond the bounds of damage to land to protect the individual's interest in his bodily
welfare and chattels wherever the defendant's activities can be described as "non-natural".
See Bell Telephone Co. v. Ottawa Elec. Co. (1920), 19 O.W.N. 580 (H.C.); Dokuchia v.
Domansch, [1945] O.R. 141 (H.C.), [1945] 1 D.L.R. 757; Ekstrom v. Deagon, [1945]
2 W.W.R. 385 (Alta. S.C.), [19461 1 D.LR. 208; Aldridge v. Van Patter,[1952] O.R. 595
(H.C.), [1952] 4 D.L.R. 93; Heard v. Woodward (1954), 12 W.W.R. 312 (B.C.S.C.);
Saccardo v. Hamilton, [1971] 2 O.R. 479 (H.C.). It is also doubtful whether the requirement 'of escape from a close' is any longer a necessary condition ot liability. See e.g.
Holinaty v. Hawkins (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) (blasting by defendant on
plaintiff's premises causing damage); Wild v. Allied Tiling & FloorsLtd. (1966), 57 W.W.R.
187 (Sask. Q.B.) (explosion from a propane tank being used by the defendants on the
plaintiff's property).
90 J.McLaren, "Nuisance in Canada" in A. Linden ed., Studies in CanadianTort Law
(1968) at 362-69.
91 This is a distinction which enjoys the support of Prof. Newark. See Newark, The
Boundariesof Nuisance (1949), 65 L.Q. Rev. 480 at 488.
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Fletcher to negligence, rather than to nuisance. 92 In terms of authority counsel
can point to a number of cases which illustrate the second model exactly, and
show a court enthusiastically espousing nuisance and its traditional theory of
liability. A recent Canadian decision which is instructive in this regard is Esco v.
Fort Henry Hotel.93 In that case, without any knowledge on the part of the
defendants, a stone drain beneath their property, which carried their sewage
from a four inch soil pipe into a six inch pipe traversing the plaintiffs premises
became inadequate to carry off water and sewage from their establishment
because of erosion. The effluent seeped out at the junction of the drain and the
six inch pipe into the plaintiffs' basement, causing flooding. There was evidence
that the soil pipes had been installed when the existing sewage system, the stone
drain, became inadequate. The defendants or their predecessors in title had
found it convenient not to join the pipes, and they had failed to seal the joint
between the drain and the six inch pipe. In an action for damages McRuer, C.J
found for the plaintiffs in nuisance, following the nineteenth century English
case of Humphries v. Cousins.94 The following passage he felt explained the
appropriate principle of law.
The prima facie right of every occupier of a piece of land is, to enjoy that land free
from all invasion of filth or other matter coming from any artificial structure on
land adjoining. He may be bound by prescription or otherwise to receive such
matter; but the burthen of showing that he is so bound rests on those who seek to
impose an easement upon him. Moreover, this right of every occupier of land is an
incident of possession, and does not depend on the acts or omission of other persons;
it is independent of what they may know or not know of the state of their own
property, and independent of the care or want of care which they may take of i.95

He was clearly satisfied that the principle applied, whether it was the defendants
or their predecessors in title who were responsible for the modification to the
drainage system. 96 The judge's view of the matter seems to accord with contemporary authority in Canada on damage caused by filth or sewage. While some
English courts have voiced reservations about imposing strict liability in these

cases, unless negligence or a non-natural use is proven, 97 the Canadian judges in
situations involving the seepage of sewage through the soil have classified the

resulting interference as a nuisance and expressly discounted the relevance of
negligence. Ironically the Canadian view concurs with that of Lord Cairns in
Rylands v. Fletcher, who, while anxious to limit the application of the strict
liability principle, expressed full agreement with Blackburn J. that it applied
inter alia to the escape of filth. 98 The authoritative enunciation of the Canadian
92 As the only difference between the usual negligence situation and the usual Rylands
v. Fletcher facts is one of degree of risk (a question which concentrates attention as much
on the conduct of the defendant as the potential effect upon the plaintiff) this is a logical
association. It will be suggested later that in nuisance it is generally the effect of the
defendant's activities upon the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land which constitutes
the dominant element of debate.
93 [1962] O.R. 1057 (1-.C.), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 206.
94 (1877), 2 C.P.D. 239,46 L.J.C.P. 438.
95 Id., at 243-44.
96
Supra, note 93 at 1061-62.
97 See e.g. Ilford U.D.C v. Beal, [1925] 1 K.B. 671, 94 LJ.K.B. 402 where Branson J.
held that an owner of land was not liable for damage done by a sewer beneath his land
where he did not know or could not reasonably have known of its existence.
98 Supra, note 88 at 340.
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rule is in the recent case of PortageLa Prairiev. B. C. Pea GrowersLtd.99 The
appellants hired a firm of engineers to construct a sewage lagoon for the town.
Soon after the work was completed and the lagoon operative, the respondents
found evidence that sewage was seeping onto their property. The consequences
were that crops were damaged, and the mill which the respondents maintained
was flooded. It was found by the trial judge and accepted by both the Manitoba
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court that the engineers had not been negligent. In an action for an injunction and damages, the Supreme Court affirming
the decisions of the lower courts found for the respondents on the ground that
the appellants had by their operation of the lagoon caused a condition on the
respondent's land which was a nuisance. Martland J. speaking for the Court
rejected the contention that the appellants could rely in any way on the lack of
negligence on the part of the engineers. The cause of action was nuisance and
"it was not necessary in order to fix the appellant with liability for the creation
of a nuisance, for the respondent to establish negligence on the part of the
appellant or of its engineers in the construction, of the lagoon." 100 While the
facts suggest that the case had elements of both the first and second models
about it, the language of the court is expressed in absolute terms, which strongly
suggests that the court's approach would have been identical had the case dealt
solely with the unintentional causation of past damage. The judicial approach
in the sewage cases, has also appealed to courts in cases involving the escape of
steam and vapours. Thus in the early Supreme Court case of Chandler Electric
Co. v. Fuller,'01 the court following Humphries v. Cousins granted an injunction
and awarded damages where the defendant emitted steam from his plant, which
was carried into the plaintiff's warehouse twenty feet away causing damage to
the contents. While the defendant was notified of the problem some of the
damage assessed was caused before he was aware of the injurious consequences
of his operation. It may be argued on the basis of these cases that Canadian
courts accept as a more or less blanket proposition that the essence of nuisance
is an adverse effect on the plaintiff's land and once that is established (whatever
the causative factors), liability follows. As the courts in deciding these cases have
placed the emphasis upon the general head of liability, rather the particular
causal agent, there is every reason to suppose that the reasoning would be extended to other forms of interference.
Regardless of the state of Canadian authority relating to nuisances which are
consummated, it may still be possible for counsel to argue for liability within the
confines of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.That doctrine has been used from
time to time to assist plaintiffs bringing actions where the complaint relates to
pollution. In Halsey v. Esso Petroleum,0 2 a recent English case, the plaintiff
claimed inter alia that particulates containing sulphate, emitted from the defendant's oil heating process, were deposited upon and damaged clothing on
99 [1966] S.C.R. 150, 54 W.W.R. 477, 54 D.L.R. (2d) 503, aff'g 50 W.W.R. 415 (Man.

C.A.) 49 D.L.R. (2d) 91 aff'g 45 W.W.R. 513 (Q.B.), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 713. See also Lawrysyn

v. Kipling (1965), 55 W.W.R. 108 (Sask. C.A.), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 471; Connery v. Government of Manitoba, [19711 4 W.W.R. 156 (Man. CA.), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 234, aff'g (1971),
15 D.L.R. (3d) 309 (Q.B.).
100 Id., at 156-57, 483-84, 508-09.
101 (1892), 21 S.C.R. 337 aff'g 23 N.S.R. 263 (sub. nom. Fullerv.Pearson).
102 [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683 (Q.B.), [1961] 2 All E.R. 145.
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his premises and his car parked in the street. Veale J. found the defendant liable
on the ground of both nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher. The facts satisfied both
the requirements of escape and damage. 10 3 Interestingly, the judge does not
enter into a discussion of whether the activity of the defendant was a nonnatural user or not. He seems to have taken it for granted that it was. When it is
considered that the defendant's operation was a fairly modest one located in a
partially industrialized area, the decision may give some cause for optimism in
seeking to persuade the Canadian courts that the rule needs to be interpreted in
the light of existing social reality. In effect it may provide counsel with a useful
springboard for the argument that the non-natural requirement should be related
more to the magnitude of the overall social risk in running industrial operations,
than to whether the activity is commonplace in general, or in its particular
location. Canadian courts have used the Rylands v. Fletcherdoctrine in a number of situations involving substances which may cause pollution, including
insecticide, 04 natural gas, 105 prussic acid gas, 106 noxious fumes, 107 and sewage.10 8 As the effect of these agents was localized in the individual cases, the
"social risk"
decisions may well presage a responsiveness by the judges to the109
argument in cases where the adverse effects are more widespread.
The Measure of Interference in an Environmental Context
The assertion has already been made that the core issue in most private nuisance suits is the degree of the interference or harm suffered by the plaintiff. He
must persuade the court that the level of interference with the use and enjoyment
of his property by the defendant's operation is unreasonable. In effect the court
is asked to balance the competing uses of property, in terms of both contemporary social values and the surrounding factual circumstances, and to determine
whether the law should intervene on the side of the plaintiff. The process of
balancing in traditional nuisance litigation has been fully discussed elsewhere." 0
What follows are some reflections upon the ways in which the environmental
lawyer can affect this balancing process by a shrewd emphasis on the environmental interest. While there is ample authority in Canada for courts finding
nuisances where plaintiffs have suffered from the noxious effects of airborne
pollutants, subterranean intrusions by sewage, and noise,"' there are few
juidicial decisions which seek to consider the problem from a more global
2.

103 Id., at 692-73, 151-52.
104 Mihalchuk v. Ratke (1966), 55 W.W.R. 555 (Sask. Q.B.), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 269.
105 Mortimer v. Brit. American Oil Co., [1949] 2 W.W.R. 107 (Alta. S.C.), aff'd [1950]
2 W.W.R. 433; Lohndorf v. Brit. American Oil Co. (1956), 24 W.W.R. 193 (Aia. S.C.).
106 Skubiniuk v. Hartmann (1914), 6 W.W.R. 1133 (Man. Q.B.), 20 D.L.R. 323, affd
with a variation (1914), 24 Man. R. 836,7 W.W.R. 392.
107 Heardv. Woodward (1954), 12 W.W.R. 312 (B.C.S.C.).
108 Sheels Bros. Lumber Co. v. Arnprior, [1959] O.W.N. 305 (H.C.).
109 See Cairns v. CanadianRefining Co. (1914), 26 O.W.R. 490 (C.A.), 6 O.W.N. 562
in which Mulock CJ. saw a direct analogy between the imposition of liability under
Rylands v. Fletcher and its imposition through nuisance in the air pollution suit before
the court.
110 See McLaren supra, note 90 at 346-62.
111 The majority of water pollution cases in Canada have been dealt with under the
rubric of infringement of riparian rights. See text, infra.p. 5374.
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viewpoint. 1 2 Apart from those odd cases where the activity of the defendant is
of its nature reprehensible, for instance the running of a brothel,113 the conflict
has been viewed as one of choosing between what are, in the abstract at least,
equally legitimate uses of land by individuals. Looked at in that light, direct
concern for the total community and assessment of the effects of the defendant's
operations in terms of their possible long term effects has been minimal. The
environmental lawyer has to change this.
The major task is to persuade the courts that environmental considerations
require a greater emphasis on the nature and extent of the interference with the
quality of the plaintiff's life and the social ills associated with unabated pollution
and less on the normality and social utility of the defendant's operation. This
can be achieved both by emphasizing concordant elements within traditional
nuisance law, and exposing judicial statements which show open acceptance of
the environmental perspective. The first point to note is that it is well established
in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence that if the plaintiff has suffered tangible physical damage to his property then liability follows more or less automatically. In
two Canadian decisions, one involving damage to automobiles stored on the
plaintiff's property caused by the defendant's foundry operation," 4 the other
damage to the plaintiffs house and garden caused by a trucking operation on a
dirt road," 5 the courts asserted that the nature of the damage ruled out any
concern for assessing the reasonable nature of the defendant's operation, or the
location of the plaintiff's land." 6 While there is a lack of direct authority in
Canada, it is to be expected that what is true of physical damage to property is
also true of physical injury to those occupying the land." 7 Unless an environmental suit using nuisance theory is tied to trivial property damage, or injury
to an especially sensitive operation or person," 8 counsel should have no difficuity in persuading the court that a nuisance exists, even though the plaintiff
lives in an industrialized or industrializing area. Here the feeling that the indus112 As will be explained later, the environmental perspective has been more readily
exposed in riparian rights litigation, where the adulteration of the environment in question
has always been the key consideration. Interestingly the most notable nuisance case in
which the broader perspective has been utilized is McKie v. K.V.P. Co., [1948] O.R. 398
(H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201, which also involved a claim for infringement of riparian
rights.
113 The nuisance per se doctrine has not often arisen in Canadian cases, but on the odd
occasion on which it has, the tendency has been to dismiss it. See e.g. Kennedy v. The
Queen (1970), 3 O.R. 546 (H.C.) in which King J. refused to characterize a correctional
camp as such.
114 Russell Transport Ltd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron Co., [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.),

[1952] 4 D.L.R. 719.
115 Kent v. Dominion Coal & Steel Corp. (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 241 (Nfld. C.A.).
n16 Supra, note 114 at 628-29, 730-31. Supra, note 115 at 248, 257-60.

117 It would clearly be a perverse form of discrimination to limit this rule to damage to
property, particularly as we acquire more knowledge on the adverse effects of pollution
to health.
118 For cases in which the courts have denied liability on the ground of the super-

sensitivity of the plaintiff or his user, see Hourston v. Brown-Holder Biscuits Ltd. (1936),
10 M.P.R. 544 (N.B.S.C.), aff'd, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 53; Keeting v. Steeves (1946), 18 M.P.R.
389 (N.B.S.C.); Morris v. Dominion Foundries& Steel, [1947] O.W.N. 413 (H.C.), [1947]

2 D.L.R. 840; Noyes v. Huron & Erie Mortgage Corp., [1932] 3 D.L.R. 143 (Ont. H.C.);
Rattray v. Daniels (1959), 27 W.W.R. (Alta. C.A.), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 134.
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trial defendant should be compelled, if nothing more, to underwrite the social
cost of his enterprise is at its strongest.
While it is well established that where the plaintiff's complaint relates to
inconvenience in using his property, or unpleasant physical sensations, the
balancing process provides the basis for a decision, the Canadian courts have
been fairly careful not to overindulge defendants. It is widely accepted, as
already indicated, that the argument that the defendant has acted with reasonable care is of no avail, if the level of the interference with the plaintiff's use and
enjoyment is intolerable.11 9 Moreover, the cases suggest a distinct hesitance to
accept the social utility argument as a reason for denying liability.120 Indeed, on
occasion a judge has specifically rejected it. Especially suggestive in this context
is a passage in McRuer C.J.'s judgment in McKie v. K.V.P. Co. 121 In answer
to the defendant's contention that the importance of its kraft pulp mill to the
economic welfare of the community in some way justified its pollution of the
Spanish River and thus exonerated it from liability for nuisance and the impairment of riparian rights, the judge quoted from two remarkable statements by
English judges. The first was the rejoinder of Martin B. in Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter122 to the argument that the defendant's tannery operation which was polluting a watercourse on which a town relied for its water
supply was run "in a reasonable and proper manner". After finding that the
evidence was not sufficient to warrant the contention, he stated:
But suppose [it] was, how could it affect the people of Stockport? The defendants
carried on the trade primarily for their own profit, and the public are benefited
by the carrying on of all trades, for they have an interest in persons using their
industry and capital. But what answer is that to an action by persons whose water
is affected by arsenic poured into it by persons carrying on such
for drinking
123
a trade?

McRuer C.J. then pointed to an observation of Lord Blanesburgh in Manchester
v. Farnworth,124 a suit brought to enjoin and seek damages for the injury caused
by fumes emanating from the appellant's electricity station. The judge, feeling
that he was compelled to apply the defense of legislative authority, remarked
almost apologetically:

Very readily would I decide, if I felt at liberty to do so, that the loss resulting to
the plaintiff from the defendant's operation should without any qualification
119 See authorities Supra, note 74.
120 It is clear that if the level of inconvenience with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment is
minimal the social utility of the defendant's activity is going to attract more attention. If the
operation is considered useful and necessary and is carried on reasonably then that will
tip the balance in favour of the defendant - see Downs v. William Jacobs Ltd. (1962),
47 M.P.R. 367 (Nfid. S.C.) (minor inconvenience caused to the plaintiff by road excavations
which necessitated him parking his car in the street and proceeding by foot to his residence).
However, the Canadian courts seem to have shied away from the Restatement position
(see Restatement; Torts (American Law Institute: St. Paul 1939 § 826) which is that
nuisance liability always requires a direct comparison of the gravity of harm and the
utility of the defendant's conduct.
121 [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201, affd [1949] 1 D.L.R. 39 (C.A.),
atfd [ 1949] S.C.R. 698.
122 (1861), 7 H & N 160 (Exch.), 158 E.R. 433.
123 Id., at 168-69, 436.
124 [1930] A.C. 171 (H.L.), [1929] All E.R. 90.
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be borne by the Corporation. That loss is truly just as much part of the cost of
generating their electrical energy as is, for example, the cost of the coal whose
combustion is the original source of all the mischief. In a question between the
plaintiff on the one hand and the Corporation on the other I can discover no
sound principle why this loss should not be theirs. 125

Following the spirit of these dicta the Chief Justice concluded:
In my view, if I were to consider and give effect to an argument based on the
defendant's economic position in the community, or its financial interests, I would
in effect be giving to it a veritable power of expropriation
of the common law
126
rights of the riparian owners, without compensation.

The important point about this passage is that it shows a Canadian judge openly
emphasizing the social cost of the defendant's enterprise in the adulteration of
the environment, and using that factor to totally discount the social utility argument. Moreover, it indicates that support for this attitude can be found in the
most respectable places.
The importance of environmental considerations in solving conflicting use
problems has been stressed in an even more forceful fashion in a very recent
Ontario decision. In Gauthierv. Naneff' 27 an action was brought by a group of
riparian owners of property on the shores of Lake Ramsay in Sudbury, for a
quiatimet injunction to prevent the holding of a power boat regatta on the Lake
by the members of a local service club. Dunlap L.J.S.C. granted the injunction,
finding that the plaintiffs' fears concerning the effect on the "purity, wholesomeness, and potability" of the lake's water were well founded. In reaching his
decision his Honour noted that the lake was the source of Sudbury's water
supply, as well as that of the riparian owners, and that the quality of water
already had deteriorated. In support of his contention that riparian owners
were entitled to water in its natural state, he referred to a passage in the sixth
edition of Kerr on Injunctions which implies that the vindication of riparian
right is related to the "unreasonable" nature of the defendant's use. Commenting

on the use of that term he remarked:
I deem it appropriate to interpret the word "unreasonable" in the light of present
day knowledge of a concern for pollution problems, at this moment in time, as
they apply to the particular circumstances
of the water supply in Lake Ramsay
128
and the various demands made thereon.

While it may be questioned whether there was any necessity to rely upon and
explain this passage in Kerr, because, as he found, the plaintiffs were entitled
at law to water "without any sensible alteration in quality", it is significant for
nuisancelaw that he saw fit to include the broader pollution issue as a vital factor
in determining whether the use was unreasonable.
Given these examples of forthright approval of the pertinence of the
environmental perspective, and the lack of any concrete support for emphasizing
the 'social utility' factor, environmental counsel should have little reason for
hesitation in developing openly his argument on the new realities of conflicting
land use.
125 Id., at 203-4, 105.
126 Supra, note 121.
127 [1971] 1 O.R. 97 (H.C.), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513.
128 Id., at 101, 517.
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In order to highlight the extent and degree of the pollution problem, concerned counsel must be prepared to make adroit use of both lay and expert
witnesses. Perhaps the most effective way to expose the environment in which
the plaintiff lives is to draw heavily on lay testimony from the surrounding community. As one American environmental lawyer with active experience in the
nuisance litigation field has observed:
Lay testimony, properly developed, can establish a prima facie case by itself. Lay
witnessses can describe their observation of the pollution and how it smelled, felt
and looked. They can describe its effects on their breathing, visibility, etc. Only
lay witnesses can properly describe the damage to homes and property, and the
effect of pollution on the normal use and enjoyment of a residence, and the
annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort caused by it.129

With the presentation of genuine and concerned testimony from the community,

which indicates a widespread and troublesome pollution pattern in the neighbourhood, counsel may have done much to neutralize effectively the evidence
which inevitably will be paraded by the defence.
By astute use of expert witnesses counsel can help to underline lay testimony by affirming in authoritative professional terms the existence of an ongoing
pollution problem in the area attributable to the defendant's operation, and at
the same time can expose the adverse consequences for the future if it is not
abated. Chemists can attest to the types and levels of pollutant material in the
atmosphere; public health officers to the incidence of respiratory diseases in the
area; realtors to the decline in real estate values which may be associated with
the pollution blight. The chemical engineer will be invaluable in describing the
defendant's process, the ambit of the resulting pollution problem, the known
effects of the pollutants on common materials, and, what is most important,
control methods available and their relative effectiveness. 130 The advanced stage
of contemporary pollution control technology means that it should be possible
in most cases to effectively counteract the well-worn plea of the industrialist that
everything has been tried by pointing to one or more systems which, if incorporated into the defendant's process, would successfully reduce pollution levels.
The other key figure in developing the environmental perspective of the case
will be the medical expert. The doctor who has experience examining and
treating subjects from the afflicted area can play a vital role in conveying to the
court the very real dangers that exist not only to the health of the plaintiff and
his family, but also to that of the entire neighbourhood. Indeed the exposure of
the health hazards attending pollution promises to be131
the most significant weapon
in the forensic arsenal of the environmental litigant.
Counsel must also be ready to seek access to various types of documentary
evidence in the hands of third parties. Studies by governmental departments and
administrative agencies with concerns in the pollution field, which are related
to the problem in hand may prove invaluable in making out a case. Of particular
utility will be material concerning the defendant's adherence or non-adherence
129 D. Hadden, supra, note 49 at 94. For an instructive judicial comment recognizing
the strength of lay testimony in a pollution suit, see McNiven v. Crawford, [1940] O.W.N.
323 (C.A.), per Robertson C... at 325.
130 Id., at 95-96. See also illustrative direct examination of an expert engineer at 97-101.
131 Id., at 95-96. See illustrative direct examination of plaintiff's doctor; at 102-03.
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to legislative standards and regulations which prescribe maximum emission
levels. While compliance or non-compliance with legislative standards should
not necessarily constitute a conclusive criterion of liability, because of the great
number of variables which affect pollution levels, and which make for significant
differences in the degree of interference experiences by the public in different
locales, the existence of those standards may be utilized by the courts as an
established and carefully devised reference system. 132 In order to expose this
type of data the cooperation of the bodies concerned should be actively sought.
If access is denied and, as Professor Lucas has shown, Canadian administrators
have on occasion shown themselves singularly uncooperative,13433 then counsel
must exploit to the full the subpoena procedures open to him.
The Relative NeighbourhoodEquation
In balancing the competing uses of land in traditional nuisance law considerable emphasis has been laid in the physical location of the parties. In essence
the attitude of the courts, encapsulated in Thesiger L.J.'s observation in Sturges
v. Bridgman that "what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not
necessarily be so in Bermondsey", 135 is that the closer the plaintiff lives to an
industrial environment the less freedom from the necessary by-products of that
milieu he can claim.
It is true that Canadian judges like their English counterparts have been
careful not to give the impression that the industrialist can operate with complete
insensitivity to the rights of others in what he may feel to be his particular bailiwick. 136 Moreover they have rejected the "coming to the nuisance" defence
which has gained some support in American jurisprudence. 137 However, they
have been willing to allow him a degree of freedom which would be considered
thoroughly offensive in a select residential area. As liability in nuisance at this
point is a relative matter, this form of discrimination may seem perfectly justifiable. However, viewed in the sober light of economic and social reality, as well
as contemporary technological possibility, the argument begins to look somewhat tarnished. The validity of this circumstantial factor as an important element
in the weighing process presupposes that there is always some degree of real
choice in terms of where a person lives and the life style he enjoys. To the nine3.

132 For a case in which a Canadian court used a legislative injunction in imposing
liability on a polluter see Suzuki v. lonion Leader, [1950] Exch. C.R. 427, [1950] 3 D.L.R.
790 (discharging oil into Frazer River a breach of s. 33 of Federal Fisheries Act enjoining
putting any 'deleterious substance into waters frequented by fish'). See also Note, Water
Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions (1970), 79 Yale L.J. 102.
133 Lucas, supra,note 5.
134 It would also seem worthwhile to exploit procedures for the production of documents in the hands of third parties. See e.g. Ontario Rules of Court 1970, r.349. If government officials are loath to reveal reports relating to the defendant's pollution control record
a court might be willing to compel production and permit inspection under this type of
provision.
135 (1879), 11 Ch. D. 852, 865,48 L.J. Ch. 785.
136 Gagnon v. Dominion Stamping Co. (1914), 7 O.W.N. 530 (H.C.) (use of steam
hammers in an industrial neighbourhood); Hydro Electric Power Comm'n v. Hill (1920),
19 O.W.N. 45 (H.C.) (operation of a billiard room in business area without insulation).
137 Drysdale v. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20; Keeting v. Steeves (1946), 18 M.P.R. 389
(N.B.S.C.); Belisle v. Canadian Cotton Ltd., [1952] O.W.N. 114 (H.C.).
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teenth century judge, who was either a socio-economic determinist or wedded
to a naive belief that a laissez-faire philosophy was the door to Utopia, choice
may either have been irrelevant or axiomatic. Today, however, with clear evidence that a sizeable minority of the population exist in a social and economic
environment in which choice is illusory and thus are compelled to live in areas
in which a pollution blight exists with little hope of relocation, discrimination on
the grounds of physical proximity to pollution sources is inequitable. To sustain
this factor as a primary consideration may well mean that the courts will be
accepting the fact that those who suffer most from the ravages of pollution are
the least worthy of protection. 138 The tragic irony of the situation is that they will
be doing this, while at the same time they are responding favourably to the
claims of those who live in more distant residential neighbourhoods. As it is
now recognized that the effects of pollution are far more diffuse and widespread
than formerly supposed and that accordingly it is difficult for the wealthier
elements of the population to escape from pollution problems, it is only to be
expected that the incidence of suits to protect such neighbourhoods will
increase.
In seeking to de-emphasize the "neighbourhood equation" environmental
counsel may have a formidable argument in the fact that often there is no good
technological reason why those adjacent to industrial processing should be
subjected to the pollution levels which in the past were considered inevitable.
The application of pollution control devices can reduce significantly the interference experienced by those in the immediate neighbourhood, whatever form
the pollution takes. The judge of the past may be excused for having supposed
that industrial expansion by its nature demanded a sacrifice in terms of the
quality of life from certain segments of the population. There is no such excuse
available to the contemporary judge. It can be argued, therefore, that both from
the viewpoint of an equitable approach to the vindication by law of the rights of
citizens and of a practical approach to environmental protection the physical
location of the parties is of less significance today, than heretofore. Of course,
it should not be entirely discounted as a decisional element. The ambient
environment of Windsor, Ontario is always likely to differ from that of Mozart,
138

An unfortunate example of reasoning based on this type df discrimination is the
judgment of Winter J. in Kent v. Dominion Steel & Coal Corp. (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 62
(Nfid. S.C.) at 76. In determining whether the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, whose
father had 'for convenience' constructed a home close to the defendant's plant, could
succeed in an action for nuisance for the dust problem caused by the company's trucks,

he remarked:
"When the whole matter is closely examined, it is hard to see how the plaintiff's
case is essentially different from that of dwellers, whether miners or not, near coal
mines, or of those living in close proximity to steel works, paper industries, automobile plants or other large manufacturing concerns. What they may suffer from
coal dust, noise, disagreeable odours and so on is part of the price they, and society
at large, have to pay for progress. More and more, as time goes on, and as population increases and land is taken over for industrial enterprises and activities which
are for the general weal but unavoidably bring discomforts and inconveniences in
their train, so more and more do the rather rigid rules of the law of nuisance laid
down in mid-Victorian times, when life was easier and space more plentiful,
require to be modified."
See also Lockwood v. Brentwood Park Investments Ltd. (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 143
(N.S.S.C.) 165 (city dwellers of today necessarily forfeit the environmental purity of
yesteryear).
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Saskatchewan, and there will always be some who by choice prefer the bustling
mel6e of the former, to the easygoing tranquility of the latter. The essence of
the argument is that judges abandon the type of judicial zoning which reflects an
"over the tracks" mentality and which has allowed industry to dictate for so
long the life style of those who live within the shadows of "its dark Satanic
1 39
nillS."

It may of course be argued that the resolution of pollution problems flowing from conflicting land use in certain locales is a matter for legislative or
administrative initiative as part of a general zoning pattern, rather than for
unorganized judicial intervention. While it would be foolish to deny the value
of zoning regulation in obviating some of the serious use conflicts of the past, it
is submitted that zoning is not the exclusive answer to contemporary pollution
problems. In the first place, the development of zoning patterns in this country
has not at this point in time resulted in complete rationalization of land use. The
process of carving out exclusive use areas is a gradual one. 140 Consequently, in
fringe areas where a dominant use is not yet established or which is in the process of conversion, and competing uses are recognized or non-conforming uses
permitted, zoning will have been somewhat deficient as an elixir for pollution.
Of course, these are the types of areas in which pollution problems are at their
most aggravated. Secondly, as zoning policy-making is in the hands of local
government, there are political and economic factors to be considered, which
often belie the development of programs with environmental considerations as
primary motivating factors. 141 Finally, it is clear that, even with a rational
division of land use, the nature and incidence of pollution, especially air and
water pollution, is so capricious that man-made terrestrial boundaries are
rendered meaningless, and areas far from industrial concentrations may experience its adverse effects. 142
The conclusion is that while zoning regulations may have an important
complementary role to play in developing more general solutions to pollution,
they are not an instant cure-all, and should not therefore dictate whether nuisance law is relevant to the broad problems of pollution, nor compel decisions
in individual nuisance cases. Canadian courts have been very careful to reject
the contention that the result of a nuisance suit is determinable by applicable
zoning regulations. It is of no avail to the industrial defendant to claim the pro139

For a spirited repudiation of the notion that an employee of a polluter sacrifices
his rights if he lives close to his employer's plant, see Kent v. Dominion Steel & Coal Corp.
(1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 241 (Nfid. C.A.), per Puddester J. at 257-262.
140 On the problems posed by the compromise between the need for rational zoning
plans, and the concern to protect established uses, see I. Milner, Community Planning-

A Casebook of Law and Administration (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1963) at 493
et seq..
141 Id., at 193 et seq. An unfortunate example of the victory of the politicians over
the planners is provided by the recent decision of Windsor City Council to allow a
developer to construct a low income housing complex on land bounded by industrial and
commercial property. See Dept. of Planning and Urban Renewal Report to City of Windsor
PlanningBoard (Re: Low-cost Housing Development, Jefferson Blvd. and Tecumseh Rd.)
Aug. 13th 1970.

142 It would, for instance, at the present time be somewhat difficult to produce a zoning

plan for the City of Windsor, which would enable some of the residents of that city to

escape the often serious air borne pollution from the Detroit area.
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tection of a zoning regulation which permits his operation, if he is in fact causing
a significant degree of interference with adjacent property. 143 A fortioriit should
be impossible for him to argue that zoning regulations have usurped in some
fashion the judicial function in evaluating competing uses of land.
4.

The DurationFactor
It is sometimes maintained that nuisance connotes a continuing or recurring interference with the use and enjoyment of land, and therefore cannot
apply where the plaintiff's claim relates to an isolated incident. While there may
be something of an inconsistency with previous comments upon the relationship
of nuisance and Rylands v. Fletcher,144 the writer is inclined to reject this contention as a general proposition. In part the inconsistency is more apparent than
real. In the first place the consequences of a single, transitory act on the part of
the defendant may spread over a considerable period of time. Thus the brief
discharge of oil from a tanker on the Great Lakes, or a navigable river may be
felt by property occupiers in the area for weeks thereafter, and constitute a
continuing menace. Secondly, it has always been accepted that a nuisance action
may be launched to prevent a recurrence of damage or interference already
experienced, and it is no objection that there has only been a single isolated
incident up to that point in time. Indeed, it would be thoroughly illogical if such
an objection were sustained, because the law through the grant of quia timet
injunctions allows nuisance actions before any damage has been incurred. Thus
it should be possible for a property occupier who has suffered the shock or
tangible damage from a transitory force, such as a sonic boom, to characterize
the effect as a nuisance and to seek to enjoin any further invasion of his rights. 145
Since there is no indication in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence that injunctive
relief is available under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, that action may be of
minimal utility as an aid to pollution prevention and abatement, unless of course
the damages awarded are sizeable enough to achieve that result indirectly. The
only significant area of conflict between the two actions is where damages are
claimed which flow from a single incident, the injurious consequences of which
are almost instantaneous. Having argued earlier that Rylands v. Fletcher may
be confined in its application to such situations, it is somewhat difficult to suggest
that nuisance is a possible alternative cause of action. Overall, it seems, the
courts, with some notable exceptions, 146 have observed a distinction which rests
143 Beamish v. Glenn (1916), 36 O.L.R. 10 (C.A.), 28 D.L.R. 702; Maker v. Davanne
Holdings, [1954] O.R. 935 (H.C.), [1955] 1 D.L.R. 728; Savage v. MacKenzie (1961),
25 D.L.R. (2d) 175 (N.B.C.A.).
144 See text supra.
145
On the general issue of the legal response to "sonic booms", see M. Katz, The
Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment (1969), 38 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 587.
at 655-61; W. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours (1968), 21 Stan. L.
Rev. 1; M. Malley, The Supersonic Transports Sonic Boom Cost: A Common Law
Approach (1968), 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 683.
146 See e.g. Midwood v. Manchester, [1905] 2 K.B. 597 (C.A.) (destruction of goods
through a single explosion of accumulated gas characterized as a nuisance); Aldridge v.
Van Patter, [1952] O.R. 595 (H.C.), [1952] 4 D.L.R. 93 (racing car speeding off track
and injuring prospective entrant on to track characterized in the alternative as a nuisance);
Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 683 (Q.B.), [1961] 2 All E.R. 145
(continuing damage and interference by air pollution accepted as falling within the rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher).
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upon the duration factor. Whether the choice of Rylands v. Fletcher over
nuisance will lead to any difference in result in individual cases is doubtful. It
has already been argued that the requirement of non-natural use can be interpreted to comprehend activities which by their nature present a pollution risk,
and there is much to suggest from a canvassing of Canadian authority that courts
would be receptive to this type of argument. 147
RiparianRights and Water Pollution: 'Natural Flow' and the Environmental Perspective
In the realm of water pollution, environmental counsel has perhaps more
in the way of forensic mobility, than in the other fields. The main reason for this,
is that in many cases he will be suing not in nuisance, but under an analogous
head, the impairment of riparian rights. In spite of attempts in some jurisdictions, notably in the United States, to equate the substance of nuisance and the
148
action to vindicate riparian rights, the latter was historically treated as discrete
and in Canada has retained distinctive features which make it a formidable tool
in the environmental lawsuit.
E.

In approaching environmental litigation in the water pollution area, plaintiff's counsel should be very careful to characterize correctly the nature of the
plaintiff's rights in the water in question. The primary question is to determine
whether the plaintiff enjoys rights in the water by virtue of ownership of the bed
of the watercourse or a privilege to take its resources on the one hand, or merely
as a riparian owner on the other. The benefit in establishing the former rather
than the latter is that the claims of the holders of rights in the water to an unpolluted environment are more extensive. A case which illustrates the distinction
is McKie v. K.V.P. Co.149 A number of plaintiffs, mostly riparian owners, but
including one party who had a property interest in the bed of the river launched
the suit against the defendant pulp mill. In part their claim related to the adverse
effect of the pollution on fisheries in the area. In dealing with the claims relating
to the fisheries McRuer C.. drew a fundamental distinction between the rights
of the plaintiff who owned the solum and the riparian owners. 150 The former
was suing to protect a distinct property right which he had in the fish in superjacent waters. Thus regardless of the effect of the pollution upon others, once
interference with his right was established, he was entitled to a remedy. The
riparian owners on the other hand whose rights in the water were merely usufructuary had no special claim to the fisheries. Their rights were no greater in respect
of fishing than those of the general public. Accordingly, the success of their
claims depended upon proof of "special damage". 151 The practical effect of this
distinction is important where damages are sought. As it will be shown, a
riparian owner may be granted an injunction for mere deterioration of water
quality. His riparian rights are sufficient to ground that claim. Where he seeks
147 See text supra.
14 8
See Crowther v. Coburg (1912), 20 O.W.R. 844 (H.C.) 846-7, 1 D.L.R. 40, 42.

For the confused situation in the United States, see P. Davis, Theories of Water Pollution
Litigation [1971] Wisc. L. Rev. 738.

149 Supra, note 121.
150 ld., at 411-14, 214-16.
151 Id., at 413, 216.
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damages, however, he can only succeed if he can prove actual injury to his
usufructuary right. Absent the latter, he is confined to a cause of action in public
nuisance.
For most practical purposes in Canada, because the title to the beds of a
large number of lakes and waterways, is vested in the Crown, the usual basis of
a water pollution suit by the private citizen will be the impairment of his riparian
rights.15 2 The riparian owner has the right to utilize the water for any legitimate
purpose connected with the use and enjoyment of his land, be it recreational,
domestic, agricultural or even industrial, subject to the caveat that the right is
exercised in such a way as to maintain the equal enjoyment of other riparians.
By definition riparian rights are correlative. 153 From the point of view of counsel
representing a client who is claiming water pollution by an industrial or municipal operation the important issue is the question of the test for balancing the
conflicting interest in water use. The answer to this seems to hinge upon the
extent to which industrial interests and public utilities have impressed the courts
with their social utility, and the economic necessity of allowing them some leeway in using the environment to dispose of their wastes. The English doctrine,
which has been enthusiastically espoused in Canada, 154 and which appears
hostile to the industrial adulteration of watercourses is the "natural flow" theory.
Perhaps the most concise explanation of this test is that of Lord MacNaughten
in John & Co. v. Bankier Distillery Co.1 55
Every riparian proprietor is entitled to the water of his stream in its natural flow,
without sensible diminution or increase and without sensible alteration in its
character or quality. Any invasion of this right causing actual damage or calculated
to found a claim which may ripen into an adverse right entitles the party injured
to the intervention of the Court.
152 The situation in Canada may be contrasted with that in England where often the
solum or a fishery is privately owned. See e.g. Pride of Derby Angling Assoc. v. British

Celanese Ltd., [1953] Ch. 149 (C.A.), [1953] 1 All E.R. 172. For an exceptional Canadian

example, see Nepisquit Real Estate & Fishing Co. v. CanadianIron Corpn. (1913), 42

N.B.R. 387 (S.C.), 13 E.L.R. 458.

153 The term "correlative" however, has to be viewed against a classification of uses
which has always favoured time honoured forms of exploitation, such as agriculture and
mining, as opposed to newer industrial projects.
154 Crowtherv. Coburg (1912), 20 O.W.R. 844 (H.C.), 1 D.L.R. 40; Clare v. Edmonton
(1914), 5 W.W.R. 1133 (Alta. S.C.), 15 D.L.R. 514; Groat v. Edmonton, [1928] S.C.R.
522, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 725; McKie v. K. V.P. Co., [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R.
201; Stephens v. Richmond Hill [1955] O.R. 806 (H.C.), (1955] 4 D.L.R. 572, aff'd with
variation as to damages [1956] O.R. 88, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 569; Howrish v. Holden (1960),
32 W.W.R. 491 (Alta. S.C.); Gauthierv. Naneff, [1971] 1 O.R. 97 (H.C.), 14 D.L.R. (3d)

513.

155 [1893] A.C. 691 (H.C.) at 698. Although Lord MacNaghton prefaces this statement
by excepting 'ordinary uses' and 'further uses ... as may be reasonable under the circumstances' it is doubtful whether he is saying any more than that certain well defined
and time-honoured uses of water are acceptable even if some pollution results, and that
other uses will be tolerated as reasonable as long as they do not sensibly alter the quality
of the water. If the writer is wrong in this latter interpretation, and Lord MacNaghton did
intend to exclude 'reasonable uses' his comments on that issue may be characterized as
obiter dictum, since the other judges clearly did not wish to go that far. See in particular
the judgments of Lord Watson at 695-97 and Lord Shand at 700-703.
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The doctrine has been used in a series of English cases to enjoin in absolute
terms the polluting activities of industrial and municipal enterprises. 156 Moreover, in the spirit of Lord MacNaughten's alternative proposition on the basis
of the claim, it has been accepted that the complaining riparian does not have
to prove damage to his interest in the factual sense. It is enough that the water
washing his banks is of deteriorated quality. 157 Here is one of those rare points
in the common law where the private litigant is able to emphasize the injury to
the environment as an integral part of his claim. The only doubt cast upon the
rigid application of the doctrine seems to be the dictum of Lord Cairns in
Swindon Waterworks v. Wilts & Berks CanalNavigation Co.158 that reasonable
use of the water by an upper riparian engaged in manufacturing is tolerable.
Just what are the implications of this dictum which related specifically to interference with the quantity of water in the area of interference with water quality
is not clear. It may be that all Lord Cairns was suggesting was that industrial
use of water was not ipso facto unreasonable, but that the labelling of the use
as reasonable is contingent upon the return of or addition to the waterflow being
free from pollutants. Alternatively, he may have mentioned the "reasonable
use" theory advisedly to allow some leeway for pollution. Felicitously for the
environmental lawyer in Canada the judges seem to have unreservedly applied
the "natural flow" theory. The most authoritative case is the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Groat v. Edmonton.159 The case involved a claim
by riparian owners for an injunction and damages against the defendant City
for polluting the water in a ravine which transversed or bounded their land, by
discharging sewage into it. A majority of the Court found that there had been
an alteration in the quality of the water and that this constituted an infringement
of the plaintiffs' riparian rights. Accordingly, they were entitled to the remedies
sought. The judgment of Rinfret, J.,160 rendered on behalf of himself and
Anglin C.J., is particularly suggestive, because it specifically relates the result
reached to the pollution problem raised. He articulated the principle which he
wished to apply in these words:
The right of a riparian proprietor to drain his land into a natural stream is an
undoubted common law right, but it may not be exercised to the injury or damage
of the riparian proprietor below, and it can afford no defense to an action for
polluting the water in the stream. Pollution is always unlawful and, in itself
constitutes a nuisance. 161

The clear message here is that the effects of the challenged use on the environment is a primary factor when considering a claim based on riparian rights.
Given the favourable state of the case law and judicial sensitivity of this nature
there is no substantive reason why the "natural flow" theory with its eminently
respectable pedigree, and a more modern interpretation stressing concern for
the protection of a valuable natural resource, should not be exploited to the

full by environmental lawyers.
156 See e.g. Mason v. Hill (1833), 5 B & Ad. 1 (K.B.), 110 E.R. 692; Wood v. Waud

(1849), 3 Exch. 748, 154 E.R. 1047; Jones v. Llanrust U.D.C., [1911] 1 Ch. 393, [1908-10]
All E.R. 922.

157 See e.g. Crossley & Sons Ltd. v. Lightowler (1867), L.R. 2 Ch. 478.
158 (1875), L.R. 7 H.L. 697, 704.
159 [19281 S.C.R. 522, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 725.
160 Id., at 527-35, 726-32.
161 Id., at 532, 730.

540

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 10, NO. 3

F. CausalProblemsin the EnvironmentalSuit
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the actionability of nuisance in the
past has been the difficulty in establishing a cause-effect relationship between
the process of the defendant and the damage to the plaintiffs interests. In
general the lack of reliable scientific data was a significant impediment to the
plaintiff making out his case. Moreover in high pollution areas, where the added
complication of numerous pollution sources existed, the difficulties in determining whom to sue and for what must have seemed insuperable. While it is not
suggested that all the difficulties surrounding the establishment of a causal link
have been solved, the utilization of accepted procedural devices, together with
full exposure of new sources of pollution data, promises to offset to a considerable degree the disadvantages formerly faced by plaintiffs.
As already noted, the plaintiff should have no difficulty in bringing to
court in the one action those whom he suspects of adultering the environment in
which he lives. 162 Indeed, one of the avowed purposes of the joinder of defendants rule is to assist the plaintiff in circumventing the problem of doubt as to
who are the real offenders. 163 Moreover, by shrewd use of the discovery procedure, by seeking the cooperation of government officials with particular knowledge of pollution problems in the area, and by presenting the evidence of independent experts counsel may have adduced sufficient direct proof to satisfy the
burden on the causal issue. The question, of course, is left of what he does if
direct evidence is lacking. The defendants may have failed to keep any record of
the effects of their operation, government studies may not exist or may not have
been publicized, and independent evidence may be inconclusive. Is there any
procedural device which would allow him to proceed without the assistance of
direct evidence? Prima facie one would have thought that the time-honoured
expedient of appealing to circumstantial evidence could be used. It has clearly
6
been accepted as valid in the context of the causation issue in negligence law.1 4
Unfortunately, the one Canadian case which seems to have considered the
matter in the context of the nuisance action would seem on the surface at least to
cast some doubt on its validity. In Newhouse v. ConiagasReduction Co.,165 an
action brought by a group of plaintiffs for an injunction and damages in respect
of the alleged death of their bees from arsenic fumes emanating from the defendant's operation, Falconbridge C.J. asserted that the burden of proving cause
lay on the plaintiffs, and that they could not relieve themselves of it by appealing
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.As the evidence adduced failed to satisfy him
that a causal link existed, he found for the defendant. How significant a negative
authority this case is may be questioned. In the first place, the judge made the
error of placing the criminal burden of proof on the plaintiffs. Secondly, he does
not attempt to elaborate on what he means by res ipsa loquitur. Thirdly, there
was a lack of any evidence as to the cause of death of the bees. It is this writer's
contention that regardless of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine
162 See text supra.

163 See supra,note 64, for examples of rules allowing for joinder of defendants.
164See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed., St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1971) at 242, n. 47.
165 (1917), 12 O.W.N. 136 (H.C.).
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tied closely to negligence law, which has developed its own peculiar corollaries,
it is open for the plaintiff to adduce circumstantial evidence as the basis of his
argument on cause in nuisance. If he can go as far as to relate the pollution problem on his land to the type of effluent emitted or discharged from the defendant's
plant, in terms of time, space and, where appropriate, meteorological conditions, then he may have said enough to allow a court to find in his favour on the
cause issue. At least he should be able to avoid a non-suit. 66
Somewhat more perplexing for environmental counsel is the problem he
faces when he is not able to establish which of a number of industrial defendants
is the cause or are the causes of his client's problem. Of course the general rule
in tort law is that if the plaintiff fails to establish a link between the defendant
and his injury then he fails. However, it has been suggested that an argument
might be made out in a multi-defendant nuisance suit similar to that which has
succeeded in some negligence cases, that where a number of defendants have
acted wrongfully in relation to a plaintiff, and he is unable, because of the haziness or confused nature of the evidence, to put his finger on the actual culprits,
the burden of proof shifts to them to exculpate themselves as causal agents. 167
This is an expedient which appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court in Cook v.
Lewis, 168 a hunting case in which the plaintiff was hit by one bullet which could
have come from one of two guns. However, there may be some difficulties in
translating the idea to nuisance law. The expedient can be justified in negligence,
because it is possible for a court to characterize the defendants as negligent or
careless towards the plaintiff before the causal issue is decided. In nuisance,
however, the tort by its nature makes both the causal issue and the degree of
interference with the plaintiff's interests essential elements in establishing the
existence of a wrong on the part of the defendant. As Professor Katz has pointed
out, to assume that the defendant has committed nuisance, before it is proven,
is to beg the central question. 169 The way around this argument is perhaps to
extend the circumstantial evidence ploy mentioned above. If the plaintiff can
point to (a) an aggravated degree of pollution around his residence; (b) the
fact that the defendants in the neighbourhood are emitting or discharging the
same type of pollutant from their plants; (c) appropriate meterological conditions; and (d) the contemporaneity of pollution emission or discharge and
interference, then he has established at least an inference that the several defendants have caused him injury.
Once it is established that a number of defendants have contributed to the
plaintiff's pollution problem, there remains the question of the relative responsibility of each. It is well established that if a particular defendant has contributed
to pollution he cannot argue his way out of liability by asserting that on its own
166

This was the traditional function of the 'circumstantial evidence' rule, now some-

what clouded by development of the so-called doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-

see C. Wright,

Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: De Boo, 1955) at 103,
reprinted in A. Linden ed., Studies in CanadianTort Law (1968) at 41.
167M. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment (1969), 38
U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 587, at 616-7.
168 [1951] S.C.R. 830, [19521 1 D.L.R. 1.
169 Id., at 618.
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his contribution to the pollution would have been insignificant.' 70 It is enough
that it has combined with others to produce an actionable nuisance. A fortiori
he cannot argue that he should be exonerated because he merely added to
existing pollution.' 71 A contention of the defendants which may cause the
plaintiff greater worry is that the combined consequences of their pollution is
divisible, so that each is liable for only a proportion of the total effect. In terms
of scientific reality one might be justifiably sceptical of such claims. Given the
interaction of different pollutants, the changes in their chemical composition
caused by synergetic processes and the capricious effects of atmospheric conditions, it should not be too difficult for the plaintiff to make the point that the
overall pollution is indivisible. Only in those instances where the pollution is
of a type which can be successfully monitored not only at the point of emission,
but also at its reception point, is any other conclusion credible. Indeed in these
cases it may be asserted that the issue of responsibility is one in which the onus
of proof should be on the defendants. The argument may be supported by a
line of Canadian cases dealing with flooding which was the combined result
of a defendant's activities and natural causes. 172 The established rule is that
unless the defendant can show a satisfactory basis for apportionment of the
damage then he is liable to the full extent.1 73 If the shifting of the onus to the
defendant and the adverse result if he fails are acceptable where the other cause
is innocent, a fortiori the argument is entitled to respect where it is culpable.
The one question mark which arises on this issue of divisibility of damages
stems from the lack of a comprehensive contribution rule amongst tortfeasors
in some provinces. Unless there is a rule allowing contribution between the
tortfeasors, which extends to nuisance and allows the paying defendant to
recover from the others, a court might be tempted to do what it considers to
be justice to the several defendants and divide the indivisible consequences
equally between them. The problem does not arise in those provinces which
have adopted the comprehensive section of the English Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 174 because joint and several liability and contribution apply whatever the cause of action, and there is no need to protect the
defendant who pays. However, in those jurisdictions where the Ontario pattern
which refers solely to actions based on 'fault or negligence' is followed, 175 the
170Lambion v. Mellish, [1894] 3 Ch. 163, 63 L.J. Ch. 929; Duke of Buccleuch v.
Cowen (1866), 5 Macph. 214 (Ct. of Sess.); Blair & Sumner v. Deakin (1887), 57 L.T. 522
(Ch), 3 T.L.R. 757; Walker v. McKinnon, [1949] O.R. 549 (H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R. 739;

Russell Transport Ltd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron Co., [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.), [1952]
4 D.L.R. 719.
171 McKie

v. K.V.P. Co., [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201; Walker v.

McKinnon, [1949] O.R. 549 (H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R. 739.
172Mackenzie v. West Flamborough (1899), 26 O.A.R. 198; Townsend v. Canadian

Northern Rly. (1922), 17 Alta. L.R. 289 (C.A.), [1922] 1 W.W.R. 1121, 65 D.L.R. 85;
Kelly v. CanadianNorthern Rly., [1950] 1 W.W.R. 744 (B.C.C.A.), [1950] 2 D.L.R. 760;
Dyke v. Rosetown (1956-57), 20 W.W.R. 1 (Sask. C.A.); Brown v. Morden (1958), 66 Man.
R. 142 (Q.B.), 24 W.W.R. 200, 12 D.L.R. (2d) 576.
173 See authorities supra,note 172.

17425 and 26 Geo. V. (U.K.), c. 30, s. 6. This provision has been incorporated into
apportionment legislation in Alberta, R.S.A. 1970, c. 365, s. 4; Manitoba R.S.M. 1970,
c. T90, s. 3, New Brunswick R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 232, s. 2; Nova Scotia, R.S.N.S. 1967,
c. 307, s. 2.
175See The Negligence Act R.S.O. 1970, c. 296, s. 2(1).
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courts may feel compelled to apply this form of distributive justice, particularly
in past nuisance situations in which the application of the action appears to
result in strict liability and thus leaves the paying defendant outside the ambit
of the statute.
G.

The Impact of the Defences to Nuisance on the EnvironmentalAction

Counsel for a plaintiff bringing an environmental suit in nuisance must of
course anticipate and be ready to counter defences raised by the polluter. In the
pollution suit context there are three defences which may prove troublesomeprescription, acquiescence or laches, and legislative authority.
(a) Prescription
Where a defendant's plant is well established and has been operating in
the same location for a long period, he may well raise the objection to a plaintiff's
claim that by virtue of his activities over that period and the uninterrupted discharge of pollutants over or onto the plaintiff's property a prescriptive right to
pollute that property has been acquired. It seems to be accepted in Canadian
jurisprudence that it is possible to develop a prescriptive right to sustain a
nuisance affecting the plaintiff's property, if the nuisance has continued without
complaint for twenty years. 176 Moreover there are judicial observations to the
effect that the prescription defence would extend to cases in which the nuisance
177
manifest itself in air, noise or water pollution.
In view of this judicial inclination, the question is raised of how environmental counsel deals with this defence. As prescriptive rights run with the
servient land it is no objection that the particular plaintiff has been in occupation
for a period less than twenty years. It is, however, an objection, as McRuer C.J.
noted in Russell Transportv. OntarioMalleable Iron178 that the adverse effects
of the user by the dominant owner have not been apparent for the whole twenty
year period. Thus if the plaintiffs land remained vacant for a period, or the
plaintiff was unaware that a nuisance existed during the twenty year span, the
defence fails. The defendant cannot argue that, because he felt he was causing
a nuisance, one existed.
A further factor, which has not been articulated by the judges, but which
seems to inhere in the nature of prescriptive rights, is the requirement that the
179
nuisance be fairly constant in incidence and effect over the required period.
This is an element which should be vigorously exploited by counsel. It will be
176 Wood v. Gibson (1897), 30 N.S.R. 15 (C.A.); Hall v. Alexander (1902), 3 O.L.R.
482 (C.A.); DeVault v. Robinson (1920), 48 O.L.R. 34 (C.A.), 54 D.L.R. 591.
177 See Danforth Glebe Estates Ltd. v. W. Harris & Co. (1919), 16 O.W.N. 41 (C.A.)
per Riddell J. at 42; Dutchman v. OaklandDairy Co. (1929), 63 O.L.R. 111 (C.A.), [1929]
1 D.L.R. 9, per Masten S.A. 28; McKie v. K.V.P. Co., [1948] O.R., 398 (H.C.) 406,
[1948] 3 D.L.R. 201, 209-10; B.C. Forest Products v. Nordal (1954), 11 W.W.R. 403
(B.C.S.C.).
178 [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.) 632-6, [1952] 4D.L.R. 719,733-8.
179J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th Ed, Sydney: Law Book Co. 1971) at 367-68.
For an English decision which specifically refers to the importance of consistency in the
degree of interference, see Hulley v. Silversprings Bleaching Co., [1922] 2 Ch. 268 (water
pollution from a dyeing and bleach factory).
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very unlikely in most instances that pollution levels and patterns have remained
constant over a period of twenty years. Changes in the level of output, expansion
of physical facilities and the incorporation of new machinery may have affected
the level of pollution in the case of industrial sources. With municipalities or
public utilities, increases in population and thus the demand for basic utilities,
will again have meant a growth in the volume of effluent and waste. Apart from
these incremental changes in pollution levels there are certain types of pollution,
air pollution being the obvious example, which vary from day to day. The
emission level may be constant, but the effects may vary considerably depending
on uncertain factors such as weather conditions and interaction with other airborne agents. A rather more subtle argument which is worth exploring is that
the effects of pollution are often cumulative in nature, so that although there
may be proof of a fairly low level output of a particular pollutant, it is unlikely
that its effects will remain constant. Thus mildly annoying concentrations of
fumes or particulates ten years ago may have been converted into emphysema in
the intervening period, and the mild adulteration of a stream then, is now a level
of deoxygenization which has effectively banished fish from the waterway.
(b) Acquiescence
It is suggested in some older Canadian decisions that delay in taking action
against or unequivocal acquiescence in relation to a nuisance is a legitimate
ground for denying a claim.180 These cases, of course, rely on the equitable
defence of laches. It is possible that this defence might be raised by a polluter
where the plaintiff concerned has been subjected to interference over a period of
time without taking action to have the nuisance abated. However, it is unlikely
to be a significant stumbling block in most circumstances. As far as unequivocal
acquiescence is concerned it has always been held that a positive act of acceptance of the defendant's operation with knowledge of its actual or potential
effects is required. 181 In practice the defendant would have to prove that the
plaintiff approved of or encouraged his enterprise, a burden which would seem
difficult to satisfy in pollution cases. Unless the industrial concern has revealed
in some detail its developmental plans, it would be hard enough for the defendant to prove that adjacent land occupiers had been apprised of the likely effects
of the new plant or process, let alone assented to them. Moreover, in the present
atmosphere of environmental concern, it is unlikely that the industrialist would
confess openly that his operation had a pollution potential.
Where delay in launching an action is the objection, apart from the special
case of interlocutory injunctions, where expedition is of vital importance, the
tendency of the courts has been to deny its validity, unless something in the
nature of fraud or unconscionable conduct can be found on the part of the plaintiff.182 Unnecessary delay may induce a court to substitute damages for an
injunction, 182a but not to deny a remedy entirely. Counsel usually should have
18OHeenan v. Dewar (1870), 17 Gr. 658 (Ont. Ch.), aff'd 18 Gr. 438; Sanson v.
NorthernRy. (1881), 29 Gr. 459 (Ont. Ch.).
181 W. Kerr, A Treatise of the Law and Practiceof Injunctions (5th Ed. Paterson ed.
Toronto: Carswell Co. 1914) at 21, 36.
182 Radenhurst v. Coate (1857), 6 Gr. 139 (U.C.C.A.).
182 a.See Nestor v. Hayes Wheel Co., (1924), 26 O.W.N. 129 (H.C.).
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no problem in countering this defence. In the first place, as the existence of a
in
nuisance is in many cases a relative matter, a plaintiff may well be justified 183
deferring his claim until he is fairly confident of his chances of success.
Secondly, the effects of certain forms of pollution are insidious and it may be a
significant period of time before the plaintiff realizes the seriousness of the
impact of the pollution on him. 8 4 Finally on a more general plane, in view of the
fact that it is only recently that the full impact of the pollution problem has
become apparent, it would be thoroughly inequitable for the courts to allow any
significant rein to this defence. If they do then they will be setting a premium
on the exploitation of bona fide ignorance on the citizen's part.
(c) Legislative Authority
The argument that the nuisance has been created pursuant to the exercise
of statutory authority is one which environmental counsel may face where an
anti-pollution suit is brought against a municipality or public utility. The defence
which has its genesis in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence in Vaughan v. Taff Vale
Railway Co.l85 seems to have had its major rationale in the very practical consideration, that with a developed notion of parliamentary sovereignty, once
Parliament authorized the development of services in the public interest which
necessarily clashed with individual rights, it was difficult for the judges to
subvert the legislative will without opening themselves to the criticism of usurping Parliament's function. Fortunately for the environmental cause, the trend
in judicial decisions, in particular in this century, has been progressively to
restrict the scope of the defence. The courts, using a variety of distinguishing
devices, have chipped away at the core of the defence to the point at which it
has become considerably emasculated. An argument which will be often open
to environmental counsel, as there is usually no express legislative direction on
the issue of tortious liability, is that the statute or regulations should be strictly
construed so as not to conflict with the basic rights of citizens. 186 He can assert
that if Parliament or the legislature wished to curb their rights, particularly the
183
84

1

SeeFrancklyn v. PeoplesHeat & Light Co. (1899), 32 N.S.R. 44 (C.A.).
The difficulties which they have encountred in dealing with limitation periods and

the ravages of insidious diseases in negligence law ought to be enough to persuade the
courts of the dangers of erecting technical obstacles to suit in the nuisance field. See e.g.
Cartledge v. E. Jopling Co., [1963] A.C. 758 (H.L.), [1963] 1 All ER. 431.
185 (1860), 5 H &N. 679 (Exch.), 157 E.R. 1351.
185a. For a full account of the development and incidence of this defence, see A. Linden,
Strict Liability, Nuisance and LegislatureAuthorization (1966), 4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 196.
186 See Quebec Rly. Co. v. Vandry [1920] A.C. 662 (P.C. Can.) 679 [1920] 1 W.W.R.
901; Groat v. Edmonton, [1928] S.C.R. 522 at 533, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 725 at 730-31 per
Rinfret J. For specific examples of strict interpretation, see Jones v. FestiniogRly. (1868),
3 Q.B. 773, 18 L.T.R. 903; A.-G. v. Leeds (1870), 22 L.T.R. 330 (Ch.); Metropolitan Asylum
v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 (H.L.), Rapier v. London Tramways, [1893] 2 Ch. 588
(C.A.); A-G v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum (1869), 19 L.T.R. 708 (Ch.D.); Burgess v.

Woodstock, [1955] O.R. 814 (H.C.), [1955] 4 D.L.R. 615; Gas, Light & Coke Co. v.
Vestry of St. Mary Abbots (1885), 15 Q.B.D. 1; Alliance & Dublin Gas v. Dublin, [1901]

1 Ir. 492 (C.A.); Ogston v. Aberdeen Tramways, [1897] A.C. 111 (H.L.); C.P.R. v. Park
[1899] A.C. 535 (P.C. Can.); Guelph Worsted Ltd. v. Guelph (1914), 30 O.L.R. 466 (H.C.),
18 D.L.R. 73; Manchester v. Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171 (H.L.); Grandel v. Mason,

[1953] 1 S.C.R. 459, [1953] 3 D.L.R. 65; Connery v. Gov. of Manitoba [1971] 4 W.W.R.
156 (Man. C.A), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 234.
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right to a wholesome environment, it would have made that plain. While some
courts have gone so far as to assert that an intention to abridge private rights
can be implied, the more recent approach has been to allow this interpretation
only where the adverse result to the plaintiff's interest is found to be a necessary
or inevitable consequence of the defendant's activities. 187 Even the apparent
"inevitability" of a nuisance may be a shaky basis for the defence. As that term
has been interpreted to mean what is possible "according to the state of scientific knowledge at the time... having also in view... practical feasibility",1 88
it may be open to environmental counsel by the use of scientific data to argue
that the defendant's process is not the most efficient, since it does not incorporate the most advanced pollution abatement equipment available.
Another loophole in the defence is that a clear division has been made by
the courts between legislation which is imperative and that which is merely
permissive in content. 189 This distinction reflects a feeling that in the latter case
there is room for a consideration of whether the power can be exercised without
infringing private rights, and the legislative agent is under no compulsion to act
if serious interference is unescapable. Other variants of this argument which
may be useful to counsel are the exclusion of the defence where discretion is
allowed in the choice of location, 190 or of method. 191 In either case, counsel may
be able to effectively counteract the defence by arguing that in selecting its site,
or modus operandithe utility did not pay enough attention to the interests of the
citizens and in particular to the environmental ramifications of its decision.
Finally, the courts have approved of the expedient of shifting the onus of proof
to the defendant, so that he has to demonstrate that his conduct is authorized by
the legislation in question, and that the damage or interference which is caused
is inevitable. 192 From the environmental viewpoint this device has the beneficial
187 See Hammersmith v. Brand (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 171, as qualified by Manchester v.
Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171 cH.L.) at 182; Stephens v. Richmond Hill, [1956] O.R. 88
(C.A.) 105, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 569.
188 Manchester v. Farnworth,[1930] A.C. 171 (H.L.) at 182; Crepin v. Ottawa Electric
Co. (1931), 66 O.L.R. 409 (C.A.) at 421, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 792 at 802-3 per Masten J.A. aff'd
[1931] S.C.R. 407, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 113; Aikman v. George Mills & Co., [1934] O.R. 597
(H.C.), [1934] 4D.L.R. 264.
189 MetropolitanAsylum v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 (H.L.) 212-3 per Lord Watson;
R. v. Bradford Navigation (1865), L.. 34 C.L. (N.S.) 191; Smiley v. Ottawa, [1941] O.R.
47 (C.A.), [1941] 2 D.L.R. 390; Hopkin v. Hamilton Electric Light Co. (1901), 2 O.L.R.
240 (H.C.) affd 4 O.L.R. 258; Turpin v. Halifax-Dartmouth Bridge Comm. (1959), 44
M.P.R. 151 (N.S.C.A.) 21 D.L.R. (2d) 623; Lawrysyn v. Kipling (1965), 55 W.W.R. 108
(Sask. C.A.), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 471; B.C. Pea Growers Ltd. v. Portage La Prairie, [1966]
S.C.R. 150, 54 W.W.R. 477, 54 D.L.R. (2d) 503; Schubert v. Sterling Trust Corp., [1943]
O.L.R. 438 (H.C.), [1943] 4 D.L.R. 584.
190 Metropolitan Asylum v. Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 (H.L.); Rapier v. London
Tramways, [1893] 2 Ch. 588 (C.A.); Mudge v. Penge U.D.C. (1917), 86 LJ. Ch. 126;
J.P. PorterCo. v. Bell, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 62 (N.S.C.A.) 72, per MacDonald L.A..
191 Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Vestry of St. Mary Abbots (1885), 15 Q.B.D. 1; West v.
Bristol Tramways, [1908] 2 K.B. 14 (C.A.), Stott v. N. Norfolk (1914), 24 Man. L.R. 9
(Q.B.), 16 D.L.R. 48; Turtle v. Toronto (1924), 56 O.L.R. 252 (C.A.); Pride of Derby v.
British Celanese, [1953] 1 Ch. 149 (C.A.); J.P. Porter Co. v. Bell, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 62 at
72, per MacDonald J.A..
192 Manchesterv. Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171 (H.L.); Renahan v. Vancouver, [1930]
3 W.W.R. 166 (B.C.S.C.), [1930] 4 D.L.R. 1018; J.P. PorterCo. v. Bell, [1955] 1 D.L.R.
62 (N.S.C.A.); Stephens v. Richmond Hill, [1956] O.R. 88 (C.A.), 1 D.L.R. (2d) 569;
Lawrysyn v. Kipling (1965), 55 W.W.R. 108 (Sask. C.A.), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 471.
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result of forcing the defendant to explain his conduct and may be used as a tool
for determining whether any serious attention was paid to environmental considerations in the planning stage.
Even if counsel is unsuccessful in persuading the court that the defence of
legislative authority should be ignored, it does not necessarily mean the demise
of his case. The availability of the defence has always been contingent upon the
absence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and in the context of legislative powers negligence has been given a somewhat extended interpretation. It
is not confined to the absence of care in the circumstances, but may extend to
failure to plan the operation with due concern for the rights of others. If damage
could have been prevented by the "unreasonable exercise of powers", then it is
negligence if the defendant fails so to act. 193 Furthermore there is authority to
the effect that "it is negligence to carry out work in a manner which results in
damage unless it can be shown that, that and only that was the way in which the
duty could be performed."'1 94 Unless the polluter can prove that there was only
one feasible way of operating, it may be negligence, if he chooses a means which
is not sufficiently related to the environmental interests of the populace.
H. The CrucialIssue: Which Remedy?
The whole tenor of this article reflects a belief that there is inherent in the
action for private nuisance a flexibility of concepts which allows for the injection
of the environmental perspective. The cardinal question, however, in determining whether this cause of action is a viable means of bringing an environmental
suit is whether the courts will be willing to utilize the injunctive remedy. In most
instances the purpose of environmental litigation will be to seek an improvement
in the environment in which the plaintiff and his neighbours live. The most
satisfactory way of achieving this is to persuade the court to restrain the defendant from conducting his operations in such a way as to cause pollution. By grant
of a perpetual prohibitory injunction direct pressure is brought upon the
offender to seek ways of obviating the pollution which he is causing, and if he
fails to comply his enterprise may be curtailed entirely. It may be argued that
the same result can be achieved, albeit indirectly, through the award of damages.
This assumes, however, that the damages awarded are high enough to cause the
industrialist to consider changing his modus operandi.If the damages are modest
he may look upon them as a license to continue pollution. If this is allowed to
happen then the environmental interest is effectively subverted. 195
The grant of injunctive relief as an equitable remedy has always been
labelled as discretionary. The question of its availability in environmental suits
seems to hang upon the nature and extent of that discretion, and how far it is
limited in practice by accepted precedent. Counsel in Canada is faced with a
corpus of authority which indicates some degree of ambivalence. In brief there
are two lines of case law. The first follows the spirit of English jurisprudence,
193 Geddis v. Bann Reservoir (1878), 3 App. Cas. 430 (H.L.) at 455.

194ProvenderMillers v. Southampton C.B.C., [1940] 1 Ch. 131 at 140.
195 For an instructive judicial conflict over the importance of environmental considerations, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. (1970), 26 N.Y. 2d 218 (C.A.); 309 N.Y.S. 312,
Judge Bergan (for the majority) at 314-19, Judge Jasen (dissenting) at 319-322. The latter
is a classic example of a judge applying the environmental perspective.
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which is that, if the plaintiff has suffered significant interference, or the nuisance
is a continuing one, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction, whatever the surrounding circumstances. The second, which jibes with the majority view in the
United States, is that the grant of an injunction is dependent upon a balancing
of the equities in the individual case, a process which includes consideration of
the effect of the injunction upon the financial welfare of the defendant and the
economic destiny of the surrounding community. Both lines of authority will be
considered in some detail.
(a) The English Heritage
The English tradition in granting injunctive relief reflects very clearly a
nineteenth century socio-economic philosophy which stressed the sanctity of
individual rights. In a series of nineteenth century decisions the judges made it
quite clear that they were not impressed with the argument raised by both
public and private enterprises that the interest of the individual in freedom from
interterence must bend to the public or community interest. The clearest statement of this approach appears in the judgement of Sir W. Page-Wood V.C. in
Attorney Generalv. Birmingham,196 a public nuisance action on the relation of
a single riparian owner to enjoin the pollution of a river by the discharge of
sewage by the defendant Corporation:
There are cases at common law in which it has been held, that where the question
arises between two portions of the community, the convenience of one may be

counterbalanced by the inconvenience of the other, where the latter are far more
numerous. But in the case of an individual claiming certain private rights, and

seeking to have those rights protected against an infraction of the law, the question

is simply whether he has those rights, and if so, whether the court looking to the

precedents by which it must be governed in the exercise of its judicial discretion,

can interfere to protect them.
Now with regard to the question of the plaintiff's right to an injunction, it appears

to me that, so far as this court is concerned, it is a matter of almost absolute
indifference whether the decision will affect a population of 250,000, or a single

individual carrying on a manufactory for his own benefit ... I am not sitting here
as a committee for public safety, armed with power to prevent what, it is said,
will be a great injury not to Birmingham only but to the whole of England; that is

not my function. My function is only to interpret what the Legislature (the proper

body to which all such arguments should be addressed) has considered necessary
... The plaintiff's rights are neither more nor less
than the Legislature has thought it proper to leave him. And the question whether
the town of Birmingham is concerned, or whether... the defendants are carrying
their own profit, is one which is entirely beside the purpose
on these operations for
19

for the town of Birmingham

to argue in this court. 7

Although judges in later cases may have had doubts about stressing individual
rights so forcefully, and although the effective application of this philosophy was
198
subsequently limited by the recognition of the defence of statutory authority,
the sentiment that the plaintiff is entitled to his injunction has remained strong in
English judicial thought. Thus in the celebrated case of Shelfer v. London
Electric Lighting Co. 199 Lindley L.J. felt constrained to say:
196 (1858), 4 K &J 528 (Ch.), 70 E.R. 220.
197 Id., at 539-40, 225.

198 See Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rly. (1860), 5 H &N 679, 157 E.R. 1351.
199 [1895] 1 Ch. 287.
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*The circumstance that the wrongdoer is in some sense a public benefactor
(e.g. a gas or water company or a sewer authority) has never been considered a
sufficient reason for refusing to protect by injunction an individual whose rights
are being persistently infringed. Expropriation, even for a money consideration,
is only justifiable when Parliament has sanctioned it. Courts of justice are not like
Parliament, which considers whether proposed works will be so beneficial to the
public as to justify exceptional legislation, and the deprivation of people of their
rights with or withoutcompensation. 200

The nineteenth century juidiciary also seems to have been capable of
scepticism over the argument raised by defendants that injunctions necessarily
meant economic ruin to them or dislocation in the community. In Imperial Gas,
Light and Coke Co. v. Broadbent20t in which the plaintiff, a market gardener,
sought an injunction to prevent further damage to his land by fumes issuing from
the gas retort house run by the defendants, Campbell L.C. stated
But my lords, what reason is there to suppose that they could not go on supplying
gas as they did before the new retort was resorted to? They supplied a large district
before, and that district may still be supplied, and they may for anything I know,
discover some chemical ingredient by use of which the noxious effects of the gas,
of which the plaintiff complains, may be neutralized. The Appellants are at liberty,
under the injunction to carry on their works so they do not injure the plaintiff,
and they must either find out some mode by which they can carry gas on their
works without that injury, or they must limit the quantity of gas to that which they
made before this new retort was constructed. I do not believe that the public will at
all suffer from this injunction being maintained.2 02

When Attorney-Generalv. Birmingham 20 3 and the Broadbent204 cases were
decided, the only appropriate remedy which could be granted by a court of

Equity was the injunction. It was not possible to substitute damages. This shortcoming in the powers of Chancery was remedied in 1858 with the passage of
Lord Cairns Act2o5 which opened up the alternative of an award of damages.
The effect of this statute was to extend the notion of damages in nuisance to

cover prospective loss, and to substitute them if the court found that the circumstances were such that injunctive relief was unwarranted. The principles govern-

ing the application of judicial discretion in these cases are generally held to be
those laid down in the case of Shelfer v. London Electric Lighting Co.20 6 The

defendants erected powerful engines for generating electricity close to the public
house of which the plaintiff was lessee. As a result of the excavation for the
plant and the vibration and noise from the working of the engines, structural
injury was caused to the building, and annoyance and discomfort to the occupier.

In an action for an injunction and damages, the trial judge, while recognizing
that a nuisance existed, exercised what he conceived to be his power under
Lord CairnsAct and awarded damages in lieu of an injunction. The Court of
Appeal unanimously reversed this decision. Lord Halsbury20 7 was content to
say that in his estimation the Act had not changed the criteria which governed
200 Id., at 316.
201 (1859), 7 H.L.C. 600, 11 E.R. 239.
202 Id., at 611,243-44.
203 Supra,note 196.
2
o4 Supra, note 201.
205 21 & 22 Vict. c.27, s.2., otherwise known as the Chancery Amendment Act.
206 Supra,note 199.
207 Id., at 308-312.
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whether an injunction should be granted. Following the judgement of Lord
Kingsdown in the Broadbentcase 208 he felt that it was only in 'special cases' that
an injunction should be denied. This was not such a case and, since there would
have been no doubt about the grant of injunction prior to the Act, there was no
warrant for its refusal here. Lindley L.J.209 agreed that there had been no change
wrought in the principles which should apply to the grant of an injunction, and
as already indicated, refuted the suggestion that the public benefit was of any
inherent consequence. On the issue of the criteria to be applied he was somewhat
more specific, and gave examples of situations in which the substitution of
damages might be warranted:
... [I] refer, by way of example, to trivial and occasional nuisances: cases in which
a plaintiff has shown that he only wants money; vexatious and oppressive cases;
and cases where the plaintiff has so conducted himself as to render it unjust to give
him more than pecuniary relief. In all such cases, and in all others where an action
for damages is really an adequate remedy -as where the acts complained of are
already finished- an injunction can be properly refused. 2 10

A. L. Smith L.J. 211 agreed with the tenor of his brethren's opinions, but went
further than either of them in articulating the elements which would justify a
court in substituting damages for an injunction. The former he felt were
appropriate:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small
And is one which is capable of being estimated in money,
And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment,
And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant

an injunction ... 212
It will be noted that Smith L.J. used the conjunctive "and" rather than the disjunctive "or", which means that he felt that each of these criteria would have to
be satisfied in the individual case. The sentiments expressed in the Shelfer case
clearly represent the attitude of the English judiciary where the plaintiff is seeking a prohibitory injunction against a continuing nuisance, or where significant
interference or loss has occurred and there is a chance of recurrence. 213 There
has been no enthusiasm for going outside the criteria laid out by Smith L.J. and
seeking to balance the equities, or to worry over the hardship to the defendant
208 Supra, note 201.
209 Supra,note 199 at 312-18.
210 Id., at 317.
211 Id., at 318-25.

212 Id., at 322-23.
213
On injunctive relief and continuing nuisances see e.g. A.-G. v. Lewes Corpn., [1911]
2 Ch. 495; Wood v. Conway Corpn., [1914] 2 Ch. 47 (C.A.); Stollmeyer v. Petroleum
Development Co. Ltd., [1918] A.C. 498 (P.C. Trinidad); Morrow v. Stepney Corpn. (1920),
L.G.R. 458; Maberly v. H. Peabody & Co., [1946] 2 All E.A. 192 (K.B.D.); McCombe v.
Read, [1955] 2 Q.B. 429.
On injunctive relief and substantial injury, see Colwell v. St. PancrasB.C., [1904)
1 Ch. 707; Knight Isle of Wight Electric Light & Power Co. (1904), 73 L.J. Ch. 299;
Bexter v. Aldershot U.D.C. (1915), 79 J.P.J.D. 580; Rushmer v. Polsne & Alfieri, Ltd.,
[1906] 1 Ch. 234 (C.A.), aff'd [1907] A.C. 121; Gilling v. Gray (1910), 21 T.L.R. 39 (Ch.);
Bosworth.Smith v. Gwynnes Ltd. (1919), 89 L.J. Ch. 368; Vanderpant v. Mayfair Hotel
Co., [1930] 1 Ch. 138.
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or the possible injury to the local community in financial terms. 214 This inflexible

attitude was underlined recently by a dictum of Lord Upjohn in Morris v.
Redland Bricks Ltd.,215 a case which dealt with the validity of a mandatory
injunction where the defendant had removed support from the plaintiff's land.
In highlighting the differences between the criteria relevant to the grant of
mandatory and prohibitory injunctions he made the following observations on
judicial attitudes towards the latter:
It is, of course quite clear and was settled in your Lordship's house nearly a hundred
years ago in Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell (1886) 11 App. Cas. 127, that
if a person withdraws support from his neighbour's land that gives no right at
law to that neighbour until damage to his land has thereby been suffered; damage is
the gist of the action. When such damage occurs the neighbour is entitled to sue
for the damage suffered to his land and equity comes to the aid of the common
law by granting an injunction to restrain the continuance or recurrence of any acts
which may lead to a further withdrawal of support in the future.
The neighbour may not be entitled as of right to such an injunction as it is in its
nature a discretionary remedy, but he is entitled to it "as of course" which comes
to much the same thing and at this stage an argument on behalf of the tortfeasor,
who has been withdrawing support that this will be very costly to him, perhaps by
rendering him liable for heavy damages for breach of contract for failing to supply
e.g., clay or gravel, receives scant, if any respect. A similar case arises when
injunctions are granted in the negative form where local authorities or statutory
undertakers are enjoined from polluting rivers; in practice the most they can
hope for is a suspension of the injunction while
they have to take perhaps the most
216
expensive steps to prevent further pollution.

While Lord Upjohn does not make it clear in his judgement, it would seem that
his observations would apply with equal force where the plaintiff seeks a prohibitory injunction which is related solely to apprehended injury, in other words
a quia timet injunction. Once it is established that the fear of the plaintiff is wellfounded and that he in all likelihood stands to experience interference, the issue
of whether the injunction should be granted or damages substituted is resolvable

by the application of the criteria laid down in the Shelfer case.
214

For an informative critique of this judicial attitude see H. Read, Equity & Public
Wrongs (1933), 11 Can. B. Rev. 73 at 78-87. See also Bellew v. Cement Ltd., [1948] Ir.
R. 61 (S.C. Eire); Pride of Derby Angling Assoc. v. British Celanese Ltd., [1953J Ch. 149
(C.A.) , at 181-182 per Evershed M.R., at 192, per Denning L.J. at 194, per Romer L.J.
Lord Denning's comments on the propriety of the court granting an injunction against
the City of Derby to abate pollution of a river are particularly instructive on the English
approach to the grant of injunctive relief:
The remaining question is whether an injunction should be issued against them.
Sir Andrew Clark argued that an injunction should not issue. The corporation, he
said, could not dam back the sewage because that "would cause a most frightful
"nuisance" to the inhabitants of Derby, and they could not extend their sewage
disposal works because they were prohibited under the Defence Regulations from
doing so without the consent of the Minister. These are strong reasons for suspending the injunction, but are no reason for not granting it. The power of the courts
to issue an injunction for nuisance has proved itself to be the best method so far
devised of securing the cleanliness of our rivers; and in this connexion it is
significant that the law relating to nuisance has been expressly preserved by section
11 (6) of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1951.
215 [1970] A.C. 652 (H.L.), [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1437.
216 Id., at 664, 1443.
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(b) The CanadianConflict
There is a respectable body of Canadian case law which follows English
principle on the exercise of the power to grant injunctive relief, and on balance
it would seem "the English approach" enjoys the greater share of judicial
support.
The strain of individualism which has been noted in English authority has
its proponents amongst the Canadian judges. Thus Idington J. in CanadaPaper
Co. v. Brown 7 had no doubts about the primacy of the individuas rights to
enjoy his land free from unwarranted interference in determining whether an
injunction should be granted:
...As long as we keep in view the essential merits of the remedy in the way
of protecting the right of property and preventing them from being invaded by
mere autocratic assertions of what will be more conducive to the prosperity of
the local community by disregarding such rights, we will not go far astray in
taking as our guide the reasoning of any jurisprudence which recognizes the
identical aim of protecting people
in their rights of property when employing the
218
remedy of perpetual injunction.

The words of Lindley L.J. in the Sheller case, quoted earlier, have their
parallel in the judgement of Rinfret J.in Groatv. Edmonton.219
But whatever the consequence ...the principle must be upheld that unless Parliament otherwise decrees, "public works must be so executed as not to interfere
with private rights of individuals. ' 220

More pointed still is the recent observation of Stewart J.of the Ontario
High Court in Stephens v. Village of Richmond Hill.2 1
It is the duty of the state (and of statesmen) to seek the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. To this end, all civilized nations have entrusted much individual
independence to their Governments. But be it ever remembered that no one is
above the law. Neither those who govern our affairs, their appointed advisors, nor
those retained to build great works for society's benefit, may act so as to abrogate
the slightest right of the individual, save within the law. It is for the Government
to protect the general welfare by wise and benevolent enactment. It is for me, or
so I think, to interpret the law, determine the rights of the individual and to invoke
the remedy required for their enforcement. 22 2

The spirit of both the Broadbent and the Shelfer cases has been widely
accepted in Canadian case law, whether the complaint has related to actual
tangible damage or mere inconvenience, and has been applied to most of the
common forms of pollution.223 Of particular import is the fact that the Supreme
217 (1922), 63 S.C.R. 243, 66 D.L.R. 287.
218 Id., at 250, 291.
219 [1928] S.C.R. 522, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 725.
220 Id., at 534, 732.
221 [1955] O.R. 806 (H.C.), [1955] 4 D.L.R. 572, aff'd with variation as to damages
[1956] O.R. 88, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 569.

222 Id., at 813.

223
See e.g. Appleby v. Erie Tobacco Co. (1910), 22 O.L.R. 533 (H.C.); Duchman v.
Oakland Dairy Co. (1929), 63 O.L.R. 111 (C.A.), [1929] 1 D.L.R. 9; McKie v. K.V.P. Co.,
[1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201; Walker v. McKinnon, [1949] O.R. 549
(H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R. 739; Rolston v. Lapa CadillacGold Mines, [1950] O.R. 103 (H.C.);
Russell TransportationLtd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron Co., [ 1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.), [1952]
4 D.L.R. 719; Stephens v. Richmond Hill, [1956] O.R. 88 (C.A.), (1956), 1 D.L.R. (2d)
569; Atwell v. Knights, [1967] 1 O.R. 419 (H.C.), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 108.
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Court has accepted the line of reasoning in those decisions. Again the McKie v.
K.V.P. Co. case2 24 is instructive. McRuer C.J. at trial had no hesitation in
applying the Shelfer case, noting its approval of the earlier Broadbent decision,
and granted an injunction. 225 In the Supreme Court Kerwin J., speaking for the
Court, addressed the issue of the validity of the grant of an injunction on the
facts. He noted the unbroken line of English authority supporting the grant of
an injunction for a violation of right, and drew attention to the judgement of
Viscount Finlay in Leeds Industrial CooperativeSoc. v. Slack22 6 in which the
latter approved of the judgement of Lindley L.J. in Shelfer. He then commented
upon the dictum of Duff 1. in CanadaPaperCo. v. Brown227 which expressed
the view that the effect of an injunction upon the neighbourhood and the defendant must be taken into account, indicating that the same judge may later have
had doubts about the validity of that.228 On the facts of this case the answer in
his own mind was clear:
Pollution has been shown to exist, damages would not be a complete and adequate
remedy, and the Court's discretion should not be exercised against the "current
of authority which is of many years standing".22 9

This statement is important because it not only shows approval of the English
approach, but also indicates that the existence of a pollution problem is a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether an injunction should be
granted. Moreover by his thinly veiled criticism of Duff J. he seems to suggest

that there is no room for consideration of the arguments that the defendant and
the surrounding community stand to suffer financial loss.
More recent support for the proposition that the hardship upon the defendants and the social utility of his enterprise are of no consequence may be found

in the judgement of Dunlap L.J.S.C. in Gauthier v. Naneff.2 30 In granting the
224 [1949] S.C.R. 698, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 497.
225 [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.) 416-17, [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201 at 218-19.

[1924] A.C. 851 (H.L.) 855-63.
227 Supra, note 217 at 252-53.
228
He quoted from Duff J.'s judgement in Gross v. Wright, [1923] S.C.R. 214 at 227
in which that judge indicated that the primary point for consideration in determining
whether an injunction should or should not be granted was whether damages were a
complete and adequate remedy.
229
Supra, note 224 at 703, 501. It is sobering to note that the Ontario government saw
fit to persuade the legislature to pass legislation dissolving the injunction granted in this
case - The K.V.P. Co. Ltd. Act S.O., 1950, c. 33. If this move was the product of genuine
concern for a community, the economic livelihood of which was threatened, then it may
have been justifiable. However, the use of special pleading by the company cannot be
ruled out, and if that was the major inspirational factor then the action of the government
was reprehensible in the extreme.
Pursuant to McRuer C.J.'s decision The Lakes and River Improvement Att was
amended to specifically direct the attention of the judiciary towards the impact of injunctive
relief upon the local community and to allow for a 'balancing of the equities' approach in
claims resulting from the pollution of lakes or rivers by mills- see R.S.O. 1970, c. 233
s. 37 (1) (a). The absence of any litigation since 1948 relating specifically to the operations
of mills precludes any comment on how far the judges would feel compelled to take a
different view of the propriety of injunctive relief.
23
0 Gauthierv.Naneff, [1971] 1 O.R. 97 (H.C.), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513.
226
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quia timet injunction, and thus preventing the staging of the defendant's charitable event, he commented:
It is trite law that economic necessities of the defendants are irrelevant in a case
of this character. It is unfortunate that in the circumstances of this case the
rights of a riparian land proprietor come into conflict with the laudable objects of
a charitable pursuit formulated and prosecuted with sincerity by the defendants...
on behalf of their club ... Nonetheless the most honourable of intentions alone
at no time can justify the expropriation of common law rights of riparian owners. 231

The antithetical notion that in exercising his discretion to grant a prohibitory injunction the judge is entitled to consider the social utility of the defendant's
user and the adverse economic effect of a restraining order seems to have been
the brain child of Middleton J. in his days as a justice on the Ontario High Court.
After approving of the citeria laid down by Smith L.J. in the Shelter case 32 and
remarking that the cases in which damages should be substituted for an injunction 233
"must be exceedingly rare" in his judgement in Appleby v. Erie Tobacco
Co., he seems to have had second thoughts. In Chadwick v. Toronto234 in
which he found the City guilty of causing a nuisance by noise in operating
electrical pumps in a waterworks, he refused to grant a prohibitory injunction
because the pumping of the water was necessary for municipal purposes. His
substitution of damages for an injunction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Whether Middleton J. borrowed the notion of "balancing the equities" from
the practice followed with interlocutory injunctions, 234a or was influenced by
his earlier judgement in Ramsay v. Barnes,235 in which he considered the burden
on the defendant in refusing a mandatory injunction, is not clear. Whatever its
source, it clearly impressed him. Three years later in a judgement on the claim
of a group of farmers in the Sudbury area for injunctive relief against two area
smelters which were causing damage to their homes and land,236 he extended
the application of the social utility argument to the industrial polluter. With
what must have seemed at the time to be unassailable logic he stated:
Mines cannot be operated without the production of smoke from the roast yards
and smelters, which smoke contains very large quantities of sulphur dioxide. There
are circumstances in which it is impossible for the individual so to assert his individual rights as to inflict a substantial injury upon the whole community. If the
mines should be prevented from operating, the community could not exist at all.
Once close the mines, and the mining community would be at an end, and farming
would not long continue. Any capable farmer would find farms easier to operate
and nearer general markets if the local market ceased. The consideration of this
situation induced plaintiff's counsel to abandon the claims for injunctions. The
231 Id., at 103,
232

519.

Supra,note 199 at 322-23.
233 (1910), 22 O.L.R. 533 (H.C.).
234 (1914), 32 O.L.R. 111 (H.C.), aff'd by C.A. 115.
234a. See e.g. comments of Burton J.A. in McLaren v. Caldwell (1880), 5 O.A.R. 363
at 367-68.
235 (1913), 5 O.W.N. 322. It is interesting to note that on the facts of this case which
were identical to those in Morris v. Redlands Brick Ltd., supra, note 216, Middleton J.
used reasoning on mandatory injunctions which is in substantial accord with those of
Lord Upjohn.
236 Sub. nom. Black v. CanadianCopperCo., [1917] O.W.N. 243 (H.C.).
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Court ought not to destroy the mining industry -nickel
is of great value to the
2 37
world - even if a few farms are damaged or destroyed.

He thereupon awarded exceedingly modest damages to each of the plaintiffs.
The "Middleton thesis" received a potential boost from a dictum of Duff
C.J. in the case of Canada Paper Co. v. Brown2 38 in which the Chief Justice

indicated that in the proper case it would be legitimate in deciding whether to
grant injunctive relief to consider the effect on the local community and the

defendant. Interestingly, he reached this conclusion by applying the "Smith
formula" from Shelfer, detaching the fourth condition and modifying it to
extend to a situation where the grant of an injunction would be oppressive to
"innocent persons". His rationalization for this extension was that it merely
amounted to "applying the limitations and restrictions which the law imposes

in relation to the pursuit of this particular form of remedy, in order to prevent
239
it becoming an instrument of injustice and oppression."
This slender strand of authority was apparently strong enough to persuade

the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bottom v. Ontario Leaf Tobacco240 that the
rules in Shelfer had been "more liberally construed in Canada than in Eng-

land". 241 Accordingly, although the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the

operations of the defendant's tobacco factory the fumes from which were

causing him and his wife inconvenience and adverse physical sensations,
damages were substituted. The rationale is clearly stated in the judgement of
Macdonnell J.A.
•.. The defendant's factory, employing it is said some two hundred men, has been
equipped with every known device for preventing the escape of fumes and smells;
it is impossible to avoid the discomfort caused to the plaintiff without stopping
the operation of the factory altogether; to grant an injunction prohibiting the
present nuisance would mean the closing of the plant, resulting not merely in loss
to the defendant but in unemployment disastrous to a small community.242
Since the Bottom case there appears to be scant Canadian authority justi-

fying the substitution of damages for an injunction on the ground that the effect
would be detrimental to the defendant or the local community.2 43 However, in
2
371d., at 244. In1924 the Ontario Legislature enacted The Damage by Fumes Arbitration Act which effectively emasculated the power of the courts in disputes involving the
adverse effects of fumes from the roasting or smelting of nickel-copper ore. It achieved
this by forbidding the grant of injunctions, and consigning the determination of damages to
arbitration- see R.S.O. 1960, c. 86. However, although the Act subsisted until 1969,
it has mysteriously disappeared from the 1970 Revision. The physical effects of this
moratorium on injunctive relief are all too apparent in the Sudbury area.
For a spirited apologia for the "Middleton thesis" see H. Read, Equity and Public
Wrongs (1933), 11 Can. B. Rev. 73, at 78-87.
238
Supra, note 217 at 251-53, 291-93.
239 Id., at 252-53, 292-93.
240 [1935] O.R. 205 (C.A.), [1935] 2 D.L.R. 699.
24 1 Id., per Macdonnell J.A. at 209, 703.
24
2 Id., at 211, 704.
243 There seems to be only one subsequent authority which goes that far - see Belisle
v. CanadianCottons Ltd., [1952] O.W.N. 114 (H.C.). It is still, of course, open to a court
to reject claim for an injunction on the more orthodox grounds set out in Shelfer - see
e.g. Morrisv. Dominion Foundries& Steel, [1947] O.W.N. 413 (H.C.), [1947] 2 D.L.R.
840 (interferences by vibrations, dust and smoke smell and capable of being estimated
in money and compensated for by a small money payment).
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Huston v. Lloyd Refineries244 the reasoning in the Bottom case was accepted as
the ground for granting the plaintiff a limited injunction. In that case the plaintiffs had claimed an injunction and damages in respect of odours, noise and soot
which affected their residence and which was caused by the defendant's oil
refinery. There was evidence that the levels of odour and particulates had been
reduced somewhat during the year preceding trial, and Greene J. accepted that
no further precautions could be taken without the expenditure of money beyond
the means of the defendant. As he was not willing to grant an absolute injunction
which would "destroy an investment of half a million dollars" he made an order
limiting the level of emissions to those achieved in the immediate pre-trial period.
(c) Making a Choice
Comparing the incidence of these conflicting theories in the cases it is clear
that the "English doctrine" commands both more consistent and loftier support.
Accordingly it should be possible for environmental counsel to argue persuasively that it is not proper for a judge to attach any"significant weight to the
economic loss to the defendant or to the surrounding community in exercising
his discretion as to whether he should grant injunctive relief. Moreover, following the spirit of the judgments at trial and in the Supreme Court in McKie v.
K.V.P. Co.,245 and in Gauthier v. Naneff"'6 he can underline this argument by
suggesting that modem conditions and in particular the gravity of contemporary
pollution problems provide a compelling policy rationale for an old dogma. It
is possible, of course, that he will encounter judicial opinion which is rather
more favourably disposed towards the "balancing of the equities" approach,
and a judge who is ready in exercising his discretion to consider the economic
positions of the defendant and the community. This fact will not necessarily be
detrimental to his case, however, because he can argue convincingly that a
"balancing of the equities", if it is to be truly comprehensive, must also include
consideration of the adverse environmental effects of the defendant's operation
if the pollution remains unabated. Thus, two apparently opposing community
interests must be balanced against each other, rather than matching the economic
livelihood of the populace against the purely individual concern of the particular
plaintiff for a more acceptable life style, which was the effect of the "Middleton
thesis". While it may have been both practically and philosophically difficult for
judges like Middleton I. to look beyond the economic equation, because of the
widespread lack of knowledge concerning environmental deterioration and its
solution, and general satisfaction with the benefits of an expanding industrial
society, the "judicial mercantalism" of those earlier judgments cannot be justified today.247 The dangers of unabated pollution are only too apparent, the
technological aids to control are available, and social values today increasingly
reflect the desire to compensate for the tragic excesses of rampant industrialization by restoring the quality of the environment.
244 [1937] O.W.N. 53 (H.C.). See also Rombough v. Crestbrook Timber Ltd. (1966),
55 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A.), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 49.
245 [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201, [1949] S.C.R. 698.
246 [1971] 1 O.R. 97 (H.C.), 14 D.L.R. (3d) 513.
247 For a useful criticism of this type of judicial thinking in the American context, see

J. Esposito, Air & Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington (1970),

5 Harv. Civ. Rights - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 32.
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Whichever approach is followed, and the writer's bias is for the former,
the important element in the plaintiff's argument must be the discounting of the
traditional defence ploy that everything possible has been done to alleviate the
problem, or that any solution which is technologically feasible is going to be
financially. ruinous. The first contention can be discounted in most situations by
pointing to the existence of pollution abatement technology which can remove
or reduce the pollution problem. There is little doubt that industrialists will often
ignore technological reality and resist making adjustment in their processes to
accommodate pollution control, unless they are forced to think and to act. In
this respect it is particularly revealing that one of the most damning criticisms
of this attitude comes from that sector of the engineering industry which is
developing and building pollution control equipment. Thus one manufacturer
of water pollution control equipment has stated:
...we have found it very hard to place our equipment out in the field, mostly
because industries refuse to spend any money for this cause. The attitude towards
cleaning up the waste water is very negative, and they feel that they are paying
for something in which there is no profit available to them. Therefore, unless they
are forced into doing something about it, my opinion is that they are going to
continue to stall, either by pulling
political strings or denying that there is any
248
purification equipment available.

Given both the state of technological possibility and the existence of this attitude
amongst polluters the court should as a matter of course place the onus upon the
industrialist to discover ways of remedying the situation. This may be achieved
either by granting an injunction or awarding sizable damages. In every respect
the former remedy is to be preferred. The choice of an injunction shows clearly
that the court is serious about dealing with the root of the problem which has
given rise to the plaintiff's claim. Moreover, when a court grants injunctive relief
it undertakes a supervisory role in seeing that the terms of the injunction are
satisfied, and thus can guarantee that the polluter takes appropriate action. In
addition the injunction is inherently flexible and can be tailormade to reflect the
exigencies of the situation as they affect the defendant. In the first place injunctive relief need not be absolute. A limited injunction can be granted which
recognizes the practical obstacles in achieving a total solution, or that such a
solution may not be necessary from an environmental viewpoint. 249 Secondly,
injunctions do not have to be made absolute from the time they are granted. The
court may suspend the operation of the remedy for a period of time to allow the
polluter to canvas available technology, or if necessary to work out a novel
solution, and to come up with a form of control which satisfies the terms of the
248 1d., at 34 quoting from confidential correspondence.
249See Huston v. Lloyd Refineries Ltd., [1937] O.W.N. 53 (H.C.); Rombough v.
Crestbrook Timber Ltd. (1966), 55 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A.) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 49. Obviously
the grant of limited injunctions has to be approached with some caution, because its
qualified form may serve the convenience of the polluter to the detriment of the environment. However, it has to be recognized that with certain forms of pollution, noise being
the obvious example, an absolute injunction is rarely necessary. The desire of most
complainants who allege noise pollution is not to achieve total silence, but a noise level
which does not offend the ambient environment. The latter of course will vary because
of physical location. Further, noise levels in the same location will change depending on
the time of day or night. Accordingly remedial measures must be relative in nature.
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order.250 Finally it is quite clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in
CanadaPaper Co. v. Brown 51 that, if the order takes the form of prescribing
definite curbs on the operations of the defendant in order to reduce pollution to
acceptable limits, and a technological breakthrough is subsequently made which
in pollution levels, the
allows greater productivity without an attendant increase
252
defendant can apply for relief from the inhibition.
The economic hardship argument is more difficult to answer. The economic
status of industrial units varies considerably, and it is possible that in the case
of a concern with a slender profit margin, or which exists in a highly competitive
sector of production a significant outlay on pollution control would be economically embarrassing and might be sufficient to force the concern out of business,
with attendant economic dislocation in the adjacent community. Here again,
however, it is all too easy to accept the argument at its face value. If industrialists
are loath to act voluntarily in the matter of pollution control, it is quite likely
that they will parade a series of excuses as to why it is unfair to force them into
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See e.g. Beamish v. Glenn (1916), 36 O.L.R. 10 (C.A.), 28 D.L.R. 702; Taylor v.
Mullen Coal Co. (1915), 7 O.W.N. 764 (H.C.), aff'd 8 O.W.N. 445, 21 D.L.R. 481;
Appleby v. Erie Tobacco Co. (1910), 22 O.L.R. 533 (H.C.); McMaster v. Bell Bros. (1931),
40 O.W.W. 536; McKie v. K.V.P. Co., [1948] O.R. 398 (H.C.), [1948] 3 D.L.R. 201,
afld with extension of time period [1949] 1 D.L.R. 39 (C.A.), aff'd [1949] S.C.R. 698;
Walker v. MacKinnon Industries Ltd., [1949] O.R. 549 (H.C.), [1949] 4 D.L.R. 739,
aff'd with extension of time period [1950] 3 D.L.R. 159 (C.A.), aff'd [1951] 3 D.L.R. 577
(P.C.); Russell Transportv. Ontario Malleable Iron Ltd., [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.), [1952]
4 D.L.R. 719; Atwell v. Knights, [1967] 1 O.R. 419 (H.C.), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 108; River
Park EnterprisesLtd. v. Fort St. John (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 519 (B.C.S.C.).
A six month suspension period seems to be the norm in Canadian cases. However,
other factors may persuade a court to allow a longer period. The latter is often the case
where pollution results from commmunity waste disposal where both technical and
political considerations demand greater leeway for the polluter. - see Stephens v.
Richmond Hill, [1955] O.R. 806 (H.C.), [1955] 4 D.L.R. 572 (one year); Brown v.
Morden (1958), 24 W.W.R. 200 (Man. Q.B.), 12 D.L.R. (2d) 576 (16 months). Cf. Plater
v. Collingwood, [1968] 1 O.R. 81 (H.C.), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 492 (immediate injunction granted
against municipality to halt burning of refuse).
It is also possible to apply for an extension of the suspension period, if special
grounds for extra grace can be shown - see River ParkEnterprisesv. Ft. St. John (1967),
62 D.L.R. (2d) 519 (B.C.S.C.) 528; Brown v. Morden (1958), 24 W.W.R. 200 (Man. Q.B.)
214, 12 D.L.R. (2d) 576,590.
Except in the case of mandatory injunctions the Anglo-Canadian tradition is against
the Court enquiring into and directing how the defendant may best abate the nuisance.
It is for the defendant to discover the means. See Macievich v. Anderson (1951), 59 Man.
R. 24 (C.A.), 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 595, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 572. Cf. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum
Inc. (1963), 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore.) (defendants required to install electrostatic
precipitators to abate air pollution).
251 Supra, note 218.
252 Id., at 218, 296 per Anglin 3.
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that position. 253 In many cases by a reorientation of corporate priorities and the
transmission of the cost to the consumers of their goods or services the economic
burden of pollution control can be absorbed without any serious harm to the
overall economic position of the industrial concern. Even in those cases where
there is a serious economic problem to be faced by the defendant in making
changes it is the writer's opinion that injunctive relief should be granted. Again
the inherent flexibility of the remedy should be underlined. The remedy does
not have to be formulated in absolute terms, its effect can be suspended and its
substance can be revised if the economic circumstances of the polluter improve.
The possibility of delaying the application of the injunction is particularly important. If the application of the injunction is suspended it may well give the
defendant breathing space to work out a solution which enables it to comply
with the order and carry on business. It may be possible to arrange to finance
the project relatively painlessly. It may be possible to negotiate a government
loan or subsidy. The possibilities for a less dramatic solution than closing down
may be considerable.
If in the final analysis, the practical result is the shutting down of the
offending operation, then, in the writer's opinion, that has to be faced by the
polluter and the community with what fortitude they can muster. It can well be
argued that in the contemporary scale of social values endeavours to improve
the state of the environment are more important than the continued existence of
marginal or struggling industrial concerns. Apart from anything else it is not
beyond the ingenuity of society and particularly governments to compensate for
the adverse community consequences of the demise of a local employer. New
non-polluting industries may be brought in or encouraged to set up. Workers
may be absorbed in other plants or relocated. The consequences are remediable.
However, pollution, by definition, has no other solution than to restrict or
remove its sources. If it continues, then the sure result is further and perhaps
irremediable corruption of the environment. It may be argued that an award of
damages would be one less drastic way of dealing with the problem. This, of
course, assumes that damages would be less burdensome to the defendant. This
is not necessarily the case. If damages are to be a satisfactory substitute for an
injunction they should reflect fully the potential injury which the plaintiff can
expect, including further decreases in the value of his property and the continued existence of a less than satisfactory life style.254 If the pollution problem
253

The obvious arguments are economic hardship to both the defendant and the
community. For a recent example of an attempt to persuade a court of the strength of this
type of argument, see Atwell v. Knights, [1967] 1 O.R. 419 (H.C.) 424, 61 D.L.R. (2d)
108, 113 (economic hardship in moving malodorous hen houses).
The classic answer to this kind of ploy is contained in the delightfully sceptical
iudgement of Bennett J.in Andreae v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. (Ch.) aff'd
with variation as to damages [1938] Ch. 1 (C.A.). In response to the defendant's argument
that the necessity of using its manpower effectively ruled out cessation of its troublesome
operations at certain times during the day, the learned judge remarked:
I cannot help being reminded of a line I remember in "Paradise Lost": "So spoke
the Fiend, and with necessity, the tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deed."
254
See Mayne & McGregor, On Damages(12th Ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1961)
at 183-85. Quaere whether MacRuer C.J. is correct in suggesting in Russell TransportLtd.
v. Ontario Malleable Iron Co., [1952] O.R. 621 (H.C.), [1952] 4 D.L.R. 719 that a court
in substituting damages for an injunction cannot compensate for the existence of a continuing nuisance.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 10, NO. 3

is significant then the damages should be sizable. If they are sizable then
surely the same economic objection is likely to arise that the polluter may be
forced out of business. Moreover, where significant damages are levied the
remedy is absolute in the legal sense. There is no legal device for easing the
impact on the defendant, as there is where an injunction is granted. If a judge
tries to circumvent these problems by allowing economic factors to affect the
level of damages he awards, then the criteria he is using are at odds with those
generally accepted in255the award of tortious damages, and he is effectively
licensing the polluter.
Conclusion
A survey of Canadian authority in the area of nuisance law suggests that
while public nuisance has distinct limitations as the basis of an environmental
suit, private nuisance has considerable potential. Three features of the private
nuisance action are worthy of note. The first is that the conceptual framework
of nuisance is sufficiently malleable to allow the injection of the environmental
perspective. Secondly, judges who have been faced with private nuisance litigation which involved pollution problems have been prepared to recognize that
fact and to respond with judgments which show a considerable degree of environmental sensitivity. As suggested in the discussion of the relevance of physical
location, there is room for rethinking by the judges, but, given the elements of
substantive flexibility and judicial responsiveness to environmental arguments,
change is by no means impossible. Finally, it can be said that the way in which
most Canadian courts have approached the question of the selection of remedies
in private nuisance litigation suggests that they are ready to use the law to make
polluters change their ways, without the sort of outdated scruples which still
affect some American courts and which have had their supporters in some older
Canadian cases. The action to protect riparian rights is, if anything, more viable
than private nuisance because not only has the pollution element always been
dominant, but also the test applied has meant an absolute interdiction of pollution, if pollution is proven. With creative application of the potential in both
actions the courts should be able to develop the notion of admonition or "therapeutic deterrence" suggested earlier, and thus play a useful role in dealing with
this serious contemporary problem. This is by no means to suggest that litigation
is the elixir of our environmental ills. There are obvious shortcomings to a
system which deals with as complex a problem as pollution on an incidental and
piecemeal basis. Litigation is not going to solve the total pollution problems of,
for example, a large city or an extensive river system. It is, however, one instrument which can be used in the absence of effective solutions from more appropriate sources in situations where there is a clearly definable local pollution
problem. Moreover, if enough environmental lawsuits are launched against
polluters and succeed, a beneficial psychological effect on polluters in general
may accrue. A new spectre will be created, the possibility of being forced into
a public forum and asked to explain their conduct and lack of concern for
255 Indeed the whole emphasis of the English tradition in substituting damages for
injunctive relief is upon the trivial quality of the interference suffered by the plaintiff.
Only within the limits laid down by Smith A.J. in Sheller can the defendant purchase his
license,
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environmental values. Thus the stimulus for redemption may be broader than
the cases in which compulsion is actually applied.
It is the writer's belief that the time is ripe for initiative in environmental
litigation. The environmentalist has exposed and is exposing the serious ecological problems associated with pollution. It remains for the lawyer to respond
with appropriate legal techniques to combat the problems. Litigation is one
constructive expedient which can be used effectively now without waiting for
legislation or administrative initiatives. The action in private nuisance and the
action for the impairment of riparian rights are two "well-tempered swords"
available to the environmental lawyer who is anxious to respond to this
challenge.

